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2009年度 第2回 組織班ワークショップ


2009年5月21日(木) 15:00-








Shyam Sunder (Professor, Yale University)

"Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence"



We define and examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games in laboratory relative to their theoretical predictions. These closed exchange economies have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions,  and include feedback unlike open or partial equilibrium settings of most experiments. Without a role for money or credit, and abstracting away from market mechanisms, general equilibrium theory makes no predictions about how paths of convergence to the CE may differ across alternative markets. Our laboratory data reveal different paths of convergence to CE, and different levels of allocative efficiency in the three settings. The results suggest that abstraction from institutional details may have been taken too far, and, for example, the oligopoly effect of feedback from buying an endowed good is missed. Inclusion of mechanism differences into theory may help us understand markets better.


Ken-Ichi Shimomura(Professor, RIEB, Kobe University)
"A Discussion of Experiments of Markets for Design of Institutions"



I discuss the importance of comparison between theories of markets and data of laboratory experiments of markets for design of institutions. The effects on the whole economy of an economic policy are investigated by means of comparative statics.This methodology is justified by the stability of market equilibrium. Otherwise, no one can predict the effects by looking at the new equilibrium after change in a policy variable. Hence, the stability should be examined not only with theory but also with experiment.



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