

A Behavioral Explanation for the Puzzling Persistence of the Aggregate Real Exchange Rate*

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Abstract

At the aggregate level, the evidence that deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) are too persistent to be explained solely by nominal rigidities has long been a puzzle (Rogoff, 1996). In contrast, the micro price evidence for the law of one price (LOP) has consistently shown that the LOP deviations are less persistent than the PPP deviations. To reconcile this macroeconomic and microeconomic empirical evidence, we adapt the model of behavioral inattention in Gabaix (2014, 2020) to a simple two-country sticky-price model. We propose a simple test of behavioral inattention and find strong evidence in its favor using micro price data. Calibrating behavioral inattention using our estimates, we show that our model reconciles the two puzzles relating to PPP and the LOP. First, PPP deviations are more than twice as persistent as those implied solely by nominal rigidities. Second, the persistence of the LOP deviations falls to two-thirds that of the PPP deviations.

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1 Introduction

It is well known that the aggregate real exchange rate, that is, the deviation from purchasing power parity (PPP), is highly persistent. In a description of this empirical anomaly known as the PPP puzzle, Rogoff (1996) states, “Consensus estimates for the rate at which PPP deviations damp, however, suggest a half-life of three to five years, seemingly far too long to be explained by nominal rigidities” (p.648). A closely related empirical feature of real exchange rates is the gap in persistence between PPP deviations and deviations from the law of one price (LOP) as the basic building block for PPP. For example, Imbs et al. (2005) and Carvalho and Nechio (2011) argue that the good-level real exchange rate (the LOP deviations) is likely to be much less persistent than the aggregate real exchange rate (the PPP deviations).¹ These previous studies emphasize the role of heterogeneity in the speed of price adjustment. As Imbs et al. (2005) have argued, “It is this heterogeneity that we find to be an important determinant of the observed real exchange rate persistence since it gives rise to highly persistent aggregate series while relative price persistence is low on average at a disaggregated level” (p.3).

In this paper, we simultaneously explain two empirical anomalies: (1) the gap between the observed persistence of PPP deviations and the persistence predicted from the sticky-price model (e.g., Rogoff, 1996), and (2) the gap between the observed persistence of the PPP deviations and the LOP deviations (e.g., Imbs et al., 2005). To this end, we incorporate behavioral inattention along the lines of Gabaix (2014, 2020) into a simple two-country sticky-price model. In this framework, firm managers bear the cost of paying attention to the aggregate component of the marginal cost of their products. As a result, full attention to the state of the economy is no longer optimal when firms choose the prices of goods.

The key to solving the PPP puzzle is then the complementarity between the PPP and LOP deviations. After deriving a reduced-form solution for the LOP deviations, we show that they are affected by the PPP deviations when firms pay only partial attention to marginal cost. Thus, an increase in the persistence of the PPP deviations makes the LOP deviations more persistent. At the same time, through the aggregation, more persistent LOP deviations lead to more persistent PPP deviations, further strengthening the link between the PPP and LOP deviations.

The reduced-form solution leads to a direct testable implication. Using micro price data from the US, Canada, and European countries, we implement a simple test for the null

¹See Crucini and Shintani (2008) for a comprehensive empirical analysis of the persistence in the LOP deviations.

hypothesis of full attention against an alternative hypothesis of partial attention. This test is equivalent to asking whether the good-level real exchange rate is uncorrelated with the aggregate real exchange rate after controlling for common driving forces, such as the nominal exchange rate and country-specific productivity. Using various specifications, we strongly reject this null in favor of our proposed model of behavioral inattention. We also find the estimated degree of attention to be around 0.15, much less than the value of 1.0 under full attention.

In the first theoretical result, our model of behavioral inattention ensures that the persistence in the aggregate real exchange rate exceeds that implied solely by nominal rigidities. Although the setting differs, this mechanism is consistent with Ball and Romer (1990) and Woodford (2003). They show that even small frictions in nominal price adjustment lead to a persistent output gap when real rigidities or strategic complementarities are present. In our model of behavioral inattention, only small nominal frictions are needed to generate a highly persistent aggregate real exchange rate. Based on our estimates of the degree of attention, the aggregate real exchange rate is more than twice as persistent as that implied solely by nominal rigidities. In terms of the half-lives of the aggregate real exchange rate, the estimated degrees of attention suggest that behavioral inattention increases the half-life of aggregate real exchange rates by approximately 2.4 years.

In the second theoretical result, our model explains the gap between the highly persistent PPP deviations and the less persistent LOP deviations. This gap arises from the combination of complementarity and the presence of idiosyncratic real shocks to the individual price of goods. We show that both the PPP and LOP deviations are more persistent when complementarities are present. In contrast, real shocks at the goods level (but not country-specific real shocks) reduce persistence only for the LOP deviations and not for the PPP deviations. This is because the aggregation across goods eliminates the effect of real shocks at the goods level. As a result, our estimates of the degree of attention imply a substantial gap in persistence between the PPP and LOP deviations. In fact, our model predicts that the persistence of the LOP deviations decreases to less than two-thirds of the persistence of the PPP deviations when inattention is included in an otherwise standard sticky-price model.

The fact that the persistence in PPP deviations exceeds the persistence implied by nominal rigidities relates to an extensive literature that has already contributed to a better understanding of persistent aggregate real exchange rates. For instance, Chari et al. (2002) argue that while the sticky-price model can explain the volatility of the aggregate real exchange rate, it substantively underpredicts the level of persistence. Benigno (2004) emphasizes the

role of monetary policy rules rather than the degree of price stickiness in accounting for the persistent aggregate real exchange rate. Later, Engel (2019) revisits Benigno (2004) and argues for the importance of both monetary policy rules and price stickiness. Blanco and Cravino (2020) introduce a concept of the real exchange rate using only newly reset prices and find that this “reset” exchange rate explains almost all fluctuations in the aggregate real exchange rate. Our solution also closely relates to Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), who introduce strategic complementarity in pricing to two-country sticky-price models in explaining the high persistence of real exchange rates. Importantly, our explanation of the PPP puzzle does not contradict that in these studies. Instead, we focus on the importance of behavioral inattention in firms’ pricing.

A standard explanation for the fact that the persistence in the aggregate real exchange rate exceeds the persistence in the good-level real exchange rates is heterogeneity in the speed of price adjustment at the goods level, which generates a positive bias when prices are aggregated in the construction of the consumer price index (CPI). Imbs et al. (2005) point out a positive aggregation bias in dynamic heterogeneous panels, and Carvalho and Nechio (2011) consider the theoretical implications of aggregation using a sticky-price model in which the degree of price stickiness differs across sectors. Indeed, both statistical aggregation bias and multisector sticky-price models would help toward increasing the persistence of real exchange rates. In contrast, our solution can explain the gap, even if the persistence of the LOP deviations is restricted to being common across all goods. In this sense, the mechanism in our paper further enhances the ability of existing workhorse models in the macroeconomics literature. Furthermore, our model including behavioral inattention can also explain two related findings: LOP deviations are more persistent than the degree of price stickiness implies (Kehoe and Miridigan 2007), and the LOP deviations are as persistent as the PPP deviations when we focus only on macroeconomic shocks (Bergin et al. 2013).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple two-country open economy model with Calvo pricing and introduce behavioral inattention. Section 3 introduces the reduced-form solution for the LOP deviations and discusses the implications of behavioral inattention. In Section 4, we implement a test of behavioral inattention and quantify its importance. In Section 5, we assess how much the estimated degree of behavioral inattention can improve model predictions. Section 6 concludes.

2 The model

The world economy consists of two countries. For ease of exposition, we express the US and Canada as the home and foreign countries, respectively. Following Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) and Crucini et al. (2010b, 2013), there is a continuum of goods and brands of each good. Goods are indexed by i and brands are indexed by z . For each good, US brands are indexed by $z \in [0, 1/2]$ and Canadian brands are indexed by $z \in (1/2, 1]$.

We assume that US and Canadian consumers have identical preferences over brands of a particular good and across goods in the aggregate consumption basket. US preferences over the brands of good i are given by the constant elasticity-of-substitution (CES) index for good $i \in [0, 1]$. The US consumption of good i is $c_{it} = \left[\int_{z=0}^1 c_{it}(z)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} dz \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$ and the aggregation across goods gives aggregate consumption $c_t = \left[\int_{i=0}^1 c_{it}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$, where $\varepsilon > 1$. For Canada, we have the analogous equations $c_{it}^* = \left[\int_{z=0}^1 c_{it}^*(z)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} dz \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$ and $c_t^* = \left[\int_{i=0}^1 c_{it}^*{}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$.

2.1 Households

The objective of the US agent is to maximize $\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t U(c_t, n_t) = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t (\ln c_t - \chi n_t)$, subject to two constraints, an intertemporal budget constraint given by:

$$M_t + \mathbb{E}_t(\Delta_{t,t+1} B_{t+1}) = W_t n_t + B_t + M_{t-1} - P_{t-1} c_{t-1} + T_t + \Pi_t, \quad (1)$$

and a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, $M_t \geq P_t c_t$. Here, $\mathbb{E}_0(\cdot)$ denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information available in period 0, $\delta \in (0, 1)$, and $\chi > 0$. In addition, we suppress the state contingencies for notational convenience. The left-hand side of (1) represents the total nominal value of household wealth. The household allocates its wealth into money balances M_t for the purchase of consumption goods and state-contingent nominal bond holdings B_{t+1} brought into period $t + 1$. Here, $\Delta_{t,t+1}$ denotes the nominal stochastic discount factor. On the right-hand side of the budget constraint (1), the household receives a nominal wage, W_t , per hour of work, n_t , carries bonds B_t into period t , as well as any cash that remained in period $t - 1$, $M_{t-1} - P_{t-1} c_{t-1}$. The household also receives nominal transfers from the US government, T_t , and nominal profits from US firms, Π_t . In (1), the aggregate price P_t is given by $P_t = \left[\int P_{it}^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$, where P_{it} is the price index for good i . This, in turn, is a CES aggregate over brands: $P_{it} = \left[\int P_{it}(z)^{1-\varepsilon} dz \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$. The CIA constraint requires nominal money balances for expenditure, which is made at the end of the period t . The CIA always binds with equality in equilibrium.

Canadian households solve the analogous maximization problem. We assume complete markets for state-contingent financial claims across the US and Canada and the financial claims are denominated in US dollars. Thus, we convert US dollar bond holdings into Canadian dollars at the spot nominal exchange rate, S_t . The Canadian households are subject to the budget constraint,

$$M_t^* + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t(\Delta_{t,t+1}B_{t+1}^*)}{S_t} = W_t^*n_t^* + \frac{B_t^*}{S_t} + M_{t-1}^* - P_{t-1}^*c_{t-1}^* + T_t^* + \Pi_t^*. \quad (2)$$

and CIA constraint, $M_t^* \geq P_t^*c_t^*$.

The first-order conditions are standard. For the US households, we have $W_t/P_t = \chi c_t$ and $\Delta_{t,t+1} = \delta[(c_{t+1}/c_t)^{-1}(P_t/P_{t+1})]$. For Canadian households, we have $W_t^*/P_t^* = \chi c_t^*$ and $\Delta_{t,t+1} = \delta[(c_{t+1}^*/c_t^*)^{-1}S_tP_t^*/(S_{t+1}P_{t+1}^*)]$. The consumption Euler equations differ because Canadians buy state-contingent bonds denominated in US dollars.

The aggregate real exchange rate is defined as $q_t = S_tP_t^*/P_t$. The Euler equations imply $q_{t+1}(c_{t+1}^*/c_{t+1}) = q_t(c_t^*/c_t) = \dots = q_0(c_0^*/c_0)$. Normalizing $q_0(c_0^*/c_0)$ to unity yields²

$$q_t = \left(\frac{c_t}{c_t^*} \right). \quad (3)$$

2.2 Firms

For each good, US firms produce the first half of the continuum, $z \in [0, 1/2]$ of good i and employ $n_{it}(z)$ hours of labor, and Canadian firms produce the second half of the continuum, $z \in (1/2, 1]$ and employ $n_{it}^*(z)$. The production function of the US firms is given by $y_{it}(z) = a_{it}n_{it}(z)$, whereas that of the Canadian firms is given by $y_{it}^*(z) = a_{it}^*n_{it}^*(z)$. Here, a_{it} and a_{it}^* are labor productivity specific to good i . In the US and Canada, all firms that produce varieties of the same goods share the same productivity, but productivity across countries differs by good.

Goods that are shipped between the US and Canada are subject to iceberg trade costs, τ . In addition, all goods are perishable. Thus, production of good i undertaken in the US is exhausted between US and Canadian consumption, with Canadian consumption bearing the iceberg trade cost:

$$c_{it}(z) + (1 + \tau)c_{it}^*(z) = y_{it}(z), \text{ for } z \in [0, 1/2]. \quad (4)$$

Similarly, production of good i undertaken in Canada is exhausted between Canadian and

²This condition relies on our preference assumptions, which we relax in Section 4.

US consumption, with US consumption bearing the iceberg trade cost:

$$(1 + \tau)c_{it}(z) + c_{it}^*(z) = y_{it}^*(z), \text{ for } z \in (1/2, 1]. \quad (5)$$

2.3 Price setting

We introduce the behavioral inattention of firms into an otherwise standard two-country model with Calvo pricing. Firms can change their prices with a constant probability, as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Firms set prices in the buyers' currency, referred to in the literature as local currency pricing. We first present the pricing decision of fully attentive firms and then relax this assumption following the approach in Gabaix (2014, 2020). Because the pricing problem of Canadian firms is analogous, we limit our exposition to the pricing decisions made by US firms.

2.3.1 Fully attentive firms

We first specify the fully attentive firm's pricing decision. Let x_t be a generic variable. We define the log deviation of x_t from the steady-state level as $\hat{x}_t = \ln x_t - \ln \bar{x}$, where \bar{x} is the steady-state level of x_t , so that we express $x_t = \bar{x} \exp(\hat{x}_t)$. Using this expression, we write the US firm's real profits of selling goods in the US market as $[p_{it}(z) - w_t/a_{it}]c_{it}(z) = \{\bar{p}_i(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}(z)] - \bar{w} \exp(\hat{w}_t - \hat{a}_{it})\}c_{it}(z)$, where $p_{it}(z) = P_{it}(z)/P_t$ is the relative price of brand z of good i and $w_t = W_t/P_t$ is the real wage. The demand by US consumers for a particular brand of good i , $c_{it}(z) = (P_{it}(z)/P_{it})^{-\varepsilon}c_{it}$. In terms of the log deviation, this equation is written as $c_{it}(z) = (\bar{p}_i(z)/\bar{p}_i)^{-\varepsilon} \{-\varepsilon[\exp(\hat{p}_{it}(z)) - \exp(\hat{p}_{it})]\}c_{it}$, where $p_{it} = P_{it}/P_t$.

We assume that the firms cannot change their price with a probability λ . This parameter captures the degree of price stickiness. Combined with the assumption that steady-state inflation is zero, a fully attentive US firm chooses $\hat{p}_{it}(z)$ to maximize the objective function:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{it}(z) &= \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} \\ &\times \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \left\{ \bar{p}_i(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}(z)] - \bar{w} \exp \left(\hat{w}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l} - \hat{a}_{it+k} \right) \right\} c_{it,t+k}(z), \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where

$$c_{it,t+k}(z) = \left(\frac{\bar{p}_i(z)}{\bar{p}_i} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \exp \left\{ -\varepsilon \left[\hat{p}_{it}(z) - \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l} - \hat{p}_{it+k} \right] \right\} c_{it+k} \quad (7)$$

is the demand for brand z of good i in period $t + k$, conditional on the firm having last reset the price in period t .³ Here, $v_{it}(z)$ is the present discount value of real profits accruing to the firm producing brand z of good i in the US, conditional on the firm having last reset its price in period t . In (6), the second line represents the real profits in each period. The marginal cost is the real wage divided by the labor productivity specific to that good. However, because of sticky prices, real wages are adjusted with $\sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}$ accumulated from periods t to $t + k$, where $\pi_t = \ln(P_t/P_{t-1})$ denotes inflation. Real profits in each period are discounted by the stochastic discount factor $\delta_{t,t+k} = \delta^k(c_{t+k}/c_t)^{-1}$ satisfying $\delta_{t,t+k}P_t/P_{t+k} = \Delta_{t,t+k}$. In (7), relative prices are also adjusted by inflation accumulated from period t to $t + k$. Note that this objective function is for the US firms indexed by $z \in [0, 1/2]$.

The US firm's real profits from selling goods in the Canadian market are analogously defined. Let $p_{it}^*(z)$ be the relative price in Canadian markets given by $p_{it}^*(z) = P_{it}^*(z)/P_t^*$. A fully attentive US firm chooses $\hat{p}_{it}^*(z)$ to maximize⁴

$$v_{it}^*(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} q_{t+k} \quad (8)$$

$$\times \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} \left\{ \bar{p}_i^*(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}^*(z)] - (1 + \tau) \frac{\bar{w}}{\bar{q}} \exp\left(\hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{q}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}^* - \hat{a}_{it+k}\right) \right\} c_{it,t+k}^*(z),$$

where

$$c_{it,t+k}^*(z) = \left(\frac{\bar{p}_i^*(z)}{\bar{p}_i^*} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \exp\left\{ -\varepsilon \left[\hat{p}_{it}^*(z) - \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}^* - \hat{p}_{it+k}^* \right] \right\} c_{it+k}^*. \quad (9)$$

Here, $\pi_t^* = \ln(P_t^*/P_{t-1}^*)$ and $p_{it}^* = P_{it}^*/P_t^*$. In (8), the second line represents the real profits in each period. The cost of providing a unit of the good to a Canadian consumer is higher by the amount of the iceberg trade cost τ . The real exchange rate in the second line of the equation converts the cost in terms of Canadian goods to compare it with the relative price $p_{it}^*(z)$. When discounting the US firm's real profits in each period, q_{t+k} in the first line of (8) converts these profits in terms of the US goods.

2.3.2 Inattentive firms

We now consider the firm's maximization problem when a firm is less than fully attentive to the state variables that enter its objective function. This problem is called the ‘‘sparse max’’ because Gabaix (2014) originally developed a model in which the economic agents respond

³The derivation is provided in Appendix A.1.

⁴The derivation is again in Appendix A.1.

to only a limited number of variables out of numerous variables.

In our model, a firm’s marginal cost is a function of aggregate variables including the real wage and the real exchange rate, as well as microeconomic variables, such as good-specific productivity shocks. For simplicity, we assume that the firm is fully attentive to its productivity but possibly less attentive to the aggregate variables.

Let us introduce the “attention-augmented” objective function. Define $m_H \in [0, 1]$ as the degree of attention to set prices of home-produced goods in the US market, where the subscript H represents the place of production.⁵ The attention-augmented objective function is given by

$$v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{it}(z), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} \times \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \{ \bar{p}_i(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}(z)] - \bar{w} \exp(m_H \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k} - \hat{a}_{it+k}) \} c_{it,t+k}(z), \quad (10)$$

where $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht} = (\hat{\mu}_{Ht}, \hat{\mu}_{Ht+1}, \dots)'$ and $\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k} = \hat{w}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}$.⁶ In the limit case of $m_H = 0$, firms fully ignore changes in the aggregate components of the firm’s cost function, $\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}$. In the opposite limit case of $m_H = 1$, the attention-augmented objective function reduces to (6), namely, the full attention case. Because the firm is fully attentive to its own productivity, there is a unit coefficient on \hat{a}_{it+k} .⁷

In the sparse max, the inattentive firm sets its optimal price to maximize (10):

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = \arg \max_{\hat{p}_{it}(z)} v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{it}(z), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \quad (11)$$

given m_H .

In Gabaix (2014), agents choose the degree of attention endogenously. More attentiveness increases expected profits, a benefit, but being more attentive is costly. We employ the

⁵Likewise, we define m_H^* as the degree of attention to set prices of home-produced goods in the Canadian market. We represent the degree of attention to set prices of foreign-produced goods by m_F^* when selling the goods in the Canadian market and by m_F when selling the goods in the US market.

⁶For the aggregate component of the marginal costs of selling goods in the other markets, the definitions are $\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^* = \hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{q}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}^*$, $\hat{\mu}_{Ft+k}^* = \hat{w}_{t+k}^* + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}^*$, and $\hat{\mu}_{Ft+k} = \hat{w}_{t+k} + \hat{q}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}$, respectively.

⁷In the attention-augmented objective function, we do not explicitly introduce m_H as a coefficient on $\sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}$ in (7). This is because we examine the log-linearized first-order condition for the optimal prices. When we take the log-linearization, the presence of m_H in (7) does not matter for the first-order terms. Further, nor do we explicitly introduce “cognitive discounting” as in Gabaix (2020). Gabaix (2020) assumes that the effect of k period-ahead economic variables on the agent’s expectations is weakened relative to the rational agent’s expectations, in addition to the degree of attention. In the present model setup, however, we can show that the presence of cognitive discounting does not matter for our results.

quadratic cost function,

$$\mathcal{C}(m_H) = \frac{\kappa}{2} m_H^2,$$

where $\kappa \geq 0$. Given the cost function, the firm chooses the optimal allocation of attention by solving

$$\max_{m_H \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \{ v_{Hi} [\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\mu}_{Ht}, 1] - \mathcal{C}(m_H) \}, \quad (12)$$

where $\mathbb{E}(\cdot)$ represents the unconditional expectations. In (12), we evaluate $v_{Hi}(\cdot)$ at $\hat{p}_{it}(z) = \hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}, m_H)$ in the first argument and at $m_H = 1$ in the third argument. That is, the profit function is the true function under $m_H = 1$ in the third argument, but it is evaluated at the inattentive firm's action because m_H in $\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}, m_H)$ is not equal to one in general.

Following Gabaix (2014), we define the sparse max for $v_{it}(z)$ as follows. The firm's choices divide into two steps. In the first step, the firm chooses the degree of attention m_H based on the linear-quadratic approximation of (12):

$$m_H = \arg \min_{m_H \in [0,1]} \frac{1}{2} (1 - m_H)^2 \Lambda_H + \frac{\kappa}{2} m_H^2, \quad (13)$$

where

$$\Lambda_H = - \left\{ \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi} [\hat{p}_{Hi}(\mathbf{0}, 1), \mathbf{0}, 1]}{\partial \hat{p}_{Hit}^2} \right\} Var(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}). \quad (14)$$

The solution of the first step is given by $m_H = \Lambda_H / (\Lambda_H + \kappa)$. In the second step, the firm chooses the optimal price (11), given the solution of the first step.⁸

In this sparse max, the choice of $m_H = \Lambda_H / (\Lambda_H + \kappa) = 0$ is excluded as long as $Var(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}) > 0$, which implies $\Lambda_H > 0$. Gabaix (2014) showed that in the case of a quadratic cost function, the selected degree of attention is zero if and only if there is no uncertainty in the variables to which the economic agents pay only partial attention.⁹ In addition, in the special case of $\kappa = 0$, $m_H = \Lambda_H / (\Lambda_H + \kappa) = 1$ is selected because $\kappa = 0$ means that there is no cost of paying attention. For these reasons, in the following analysis, we focus on the case of $m_H \in (0, 1]$. As we discuss later, these assumptions are convenient for our objective of accounting for the PPP puzzle because they ensure the stationarity of the PPP and LOP deviations.

Note that we can also introduce inattention into the idiosyncratic productivity and derive expressions similar to (13) and (14). Nevertheless, we focus on the case that firms are fully

⁸In Appendix A.2, we derive (13) and (14) that are relevant to US firms selling in US markets. The appendix also describes the remaining sparse max for US firms selling abroad and Canadian firms selling in the Canadian and US markets.

⁹Gabaix (2014) discusses the properties of the selected degree of attention using not only the quadratic cost function but also other functional forms of the cost function.

attentive to their productivity but are inattentive to the aggregate component for three reasons. First, in general, the level of uncertainty matters for the size of the degree of attention. Naturally, the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock can be much higher than the aggregate shocks. In this case, Λ_H for the idiosyncratic productivity would be much larger than Λ_H for the aggregate component of the marginal cost, meaning that the degree of attention to the idiosyncratic variable is closer to unity than that to the aggregate variable. Second, firms may have easier access to information on their variables rather than the macroeconomic variables. In this case, κ for their productivity may be much lower than κ for the aggregate shock, such as monetary shocks. Thus, the degree of attention to the idiosyncratic variable is again closer to unity. Finally, our test of behavioral inattention in Section 4 can still detect inattention to the aggregate variable even if we allow inattention of firms to their idiosyncratic productivity. In other words, our test is fully robust to the presence of inattention of firms to their idiosyncratic productivity. In this sense, full attention to idiosyncratic productivity is a convenient assumption for focusing on the presence of inattention to the aggregate variable.

2.4 Equilibrium

The monetary authority in each country determines the national stock of money. Following Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), we assume that the log of the money supply follows a random walk:

$$\ln M_t = \ln M_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^M, \quad (15)$$

$$\ln M_t^* = \ln M_{t-1}^* + \varepsilon_t^{M^*}, \quad (16)$$

where ε_t^M and $\varepsilon_t^{M^*}$ are zero-mean i.i.d. shocks. Importantly, the stochastic processes, combined with (3) and the CIA constraints, imply a nominal exchange rate that follows a random walk, which is empirically plausible. In particular, we have $S_t = M_t/M_t^*$ from (3) and the CIA constraints. This equation leads to $\ln S_t = \ln S_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^n$, where $\varepsilon_t^n = \varepsilon_t^M - \varepsilon_t^{M^*}$ is the shock to the nominal exchange rate. We simply call ε_t^n the nominal shock.

For simplicity, we assume that the log labor productivity also follows a zero-mean i.i.d.

process:¹⁰

$$\ln a_{it} = \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (17)$$

$$\ln a_{it}^* = \varepsilon_{it}^*. \quad (18)$$

The difference in labor productivity is $\ln(a_{it}/a_{it}^*) = \varepsilon_{it}^r$, where $\varepsilon_{it}^r = \varepsilon_{it} - \varepsilon_{it}^*$. We refer to the shock to the difference in productivity as the real shock.

The profits of US (Canadian) firms accrue exclusively to US (Canadian) households. In other words, $\Pi_t = \int_i \int_{z=0}^{1/2} \Pi_{it}(z) dz di$ and $\Pi_t^* = \int_i \int_{z=1/2}^1 \Pi_{it}^*(z) dz di$, where $\Pi_{it}(z)$ and $\Pi_{it}^*(z)$ are the total nominal profits of firms producing brand z . Monetary injections are assumed to equal nominal transfers from the government to domestic residents: $T_t = M_t - M_{t-1}$ for the US, and $T_t^* = M_t^* - M_{t-1}^*$ for Canada. The labor market-clearing conditions are $n_t = \int_i \int_{z=0}^{1/2} n_{it}(z) dz di$ and $n_t^* = \int_i \int_{z=1/2}^1 n_{it}^*(z) dz di$.

An *equilibrium* of the economy is a collection of allocations and prices such that (i) households' allocations are solutions to their maximization problem (namely, $\{c_{it}(z)\}_{i,z}$, n_t , M_t , B_{t+1} , for US households and $\{c_{it}^*(z)\}_{i,z}$, n_t^* , M_t^* , B_{t+1}^* , for Canadian households); (ii) prices and allocations of firms are solutions to their sparse max for $v_{it}(z)$ and $v_{it}^*(z)$ where $z \in [0, 1]$ (namely, $\{P_{it}(z), P_{it}^*(z), n_{it}(z), y_{it}(z)\}_{i,z \in [0,1/2]}$ for US firms and $\{P_{it}(z), P_{it}^*(z), n_{it}^*(z), y_{it}^*(z)\}_{i,z \in (1/2,1]}$ for Canadian firms); (iii) all markets clear; (iv) the productivity, money supply, and transfers satisfy the specifications discussed earlier.

3 Theoretical implications for LOP deviations

In this section, we derive the reduced-form solution to the good-level real exchange rate. Taking the first-order condition with respect to $\hat{p}_{it}(z)$ from (10) and log-linearizing the condition around the steady state yield the optimal price:

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = (1 - \lambda\delta) \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k (m_H \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k} - \hat{a}_{it+k}) \quad (19)$$

$$= m_H \hat{w}_t - (1 - \lambda\delta) \hat{a}_{it}. \quad (20)$$

Here, the expression reflects the forward-looking properties in the Calvo pricing and λ affects the extent to which firms place weights on the expected marginal cost. Derivation of the

¹⁰Later, we consider an alternative stochastic process for productivity, but the empirical results from the test of behavioral inattention are unaffected.

second equality is provided in Appendix A.3. The optimal price set by US firms for the Canadian market is given by:

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_H^*) = m_H^*(\hat{w}_t - \hat{q}_t) - (1 - \lambda\delta)\hat{a}_{it}. \quad (21)$$

Similarly, the prices set by Canadian firms for the Canadian market and the US market are respectively given by:

$$\hat{p}_{Fi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}^*, m_F^*) = m_F^*\hat{w}_t^* - (1 - \lambda\delta)\hat{a}_{it}^*, \quad (22)$$

and

$$\hat{p}_{Fi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}, m_F) = m_F(\hat{w}_t^* + \hat{q}_t) - (1 - \lambda\delta)\hat{a}_{it}^*. \quad (23)$$

Turning to the price index for good i , we log-linearize the CES index for good i sold in the US market:

$$\hat{p}_{it} = \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1} - \pi_t) + (1 - \lambda)\hat{p}_{it}^{opt}. \quad (24)$$

Here, \hat{p}_{it}^{opt} denotes the weighted average of the optimal reset prices:

$$\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} = \omega\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) + (1 - \omega)\hat{p}_{Fi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}, m_F), \quad (25)$$

where $\omega = (1 + (1 + \tau)^{1-\varepsilon})^{-1} \in [1/2, 1]$ is the degree of home bias. The home bias is strictly larger than 1/2 in the presence of the iceberg trade costs ($\tau > 0$). The log-linearized price index for good i sold in the Canadian markets is

$$\hat{p}_{it}^* = \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1}^* - \pi_t^*) + (1 - \lambda)\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*}, \quad (26)$$

where

$$\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} = \omega\hat{p}_{Fi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}^*, m_H) + (1 - \omega)\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_F). \quad (27)$$

In (27), we employ the assumption of a symmetry between the US and Canada. That is, the degrees of attention in the production of domestically consumed goods are identical in the US and Canada, such that $m_F^* = m_H$. Likewise, the degrees of attention in the production of exported goods are also identical, such that $m_H^* = m_F$.

Recall that the PPP deviation, or the aggregate real exchange rate, is defined by $q_t = S_t P_t^*/P_t$. Similarly, the LOP deviation, or the good-level real exchange rate, is defined by $q_{it} = S_t P_{it}^*/P_{it}$. Using p_{it} and p_{it}^* , \hat{q}_{it} is expressed as

$$\hat{q}_{it} = \hat{q}_t + \hat{p}_{it}^* - \hat{p}_{it}. \quad (28)$$

We combine (20) - (28), and the CIA constraints to obtain the expression for the good-level real exchange rate. The following proposition summarizes the dynamics of the good-level real exchange rate.

Proposition 1 *Under the preferences given by $U(c, n) = \ln c - \chi n$, the CIA constraints, the stochastic processes of money supply (15) and (16), the stochastic processes of the labor productivity (17) and (18), and the Calvo pricing with the degree of price stickiness $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, the stochastic process of the good-level real exchange rate is given by:*

$$\ln q_{it} = \lambda \ln q_{it-1} + (1 - m)(1 - \lambda) \ln q_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi \varepsilon_{it}^r, \quad (29)$$

where $m \in (0, 1]$ represents the degree of attention:

$$m = \omega m_H + (1 - \omega) m_F. \quad (30)$$

and $\psi = 2\omega - 1$. The two random shocks ε_{it}^r and ε_t^n are given by $\varepsilon_{it}^r = \varepsilon_{it} - \varepsilon_{it}^* \sim i.i.d.(0, \sigma_r^2)$ and $\varepsilon_t^n = \varepsilon_t^M - \varepsilon_t^{M*} \sim i.i.d.(0, \sigma_n^2)$, respectively.

Proof. See Appendix A.4. ■

This stochastic process for the good-level real exchange rate generalizes the simple stochastic process considered by Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) who emphasized the importance of nominal shocks. They showed that under the fully attentive rational expectations model, the good-level real exchange rate follows an autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)) driven by the nominal shock ε_t^n :

$$\ln q_{it} = \lambda \ln q_{it-1} + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n. \quad (31)$$

This equation is a special case of (29) with $m = 1$ and $\psi = 0$.¹¹ To gain some intuition behind (31), recall that $\ln q_{it} = \ln S_t + \ln P_{it}^* - \ln P_{it}$. Suppose that the money supply increases unexpectedly in the US. Although the unexpected increase in the domestic money supply keeps P_{it}^* constant, it increases S_t and P_{it} . Notice that the nominal exchange rate is free to adjust, whereas the adjustment of P_{it} is slow because of sticky prices. As a result, the increase in P_{it} only partially offsets the increase in S_t . The extent of the offsetting effect depends on λ . If $\lambda \rightarrow 0$, a change in P_{it} perfectly offsets the increase in S_t , meaning that the nominal shock is irrelevant for the real exchange rate. If $\lambda \rightarrow 1$, P_{it} never moves, meaning

¹¹Note that $\psi = 0$ if $\tau = 0$. The absence of trade cost (i.e., $\tau = 0$) implies no home bias (i.e., $\omega = 1/2$) because $\omega = 1/(1 + (1 + \tau)^{1-\varepsilon})$. In this case, $\psi = 2\omega - 1 = 0$.

that the good-level real exchange rate tracks the nominal exchange rate, which in turn follows a random walk.

Let us compare the stochastic processes for the good-level real exchange rates between the cases $m = 1$ and $0 < m < 1$.¹² For comparison purposes, we maintain the assumption of $\psi = 0$. If firms are only partially attentive to the aggregate component of the marginal cost (i.e., $0 < m < 1$), the good-level real exchange rate has the aggregate real exchange rate on the right-hand side:

$$\ln q_{it} = \lambda \ln q_{it-1} + (1 - m)(1 - \lambda) \ln q_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n. \quad (32)$$

The intuition behind the appearance of the aggregate real exchange rate in (32) lies in the responses of relative prices \hat{p}_{it} and \hat{p}_{it}^* to aggregate shocks. If firms become less attentive to the aggregate components of the marginal cost, relative prices are more invariant to aggregate shocks. The more invariant a relative price, the more the firm anchors its nominal prices to the aggregate price level. The link between the good-level prices and the aggregate prices leads to a link between the good-level and aggregate real exchange rates.

It should be noted that there is a single common driving force in both (31) and (32) because the aggregate real exchange rate that additionally enters in (32) is also driven by the nominal shock. Indeed, aggregating $\ln q_{it}$ over i yields¹³

$$\ln q_t = \frac{\lambda}{1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda)} \ln q_{t-1} + \frac{\lambda}{1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda)} \varepsilon_t^n. \quad (33)$$

Using (33), we can see that the impact multiplier of nominal shocks on the good-level real exchange rate increases from λ in (31) to $\lambda \times (1 + \frac{(1-m)(1-\lambda)}{1-(1-m)(1-\lambda)})$ in (32). In other words, behavioral inattention changes the stochastic process of the good-level real exchange rate but not the source of its variations.

When $\psi > 0$, a real shock represented by ε_{it}^r appears in the stochastic process as an additional driving force. A strictly positive trade cost (i.e., $\tau > 0$) leads to home bias in the

¹²Note that m is the mean of the degrees of attention m_H and m_F . Because $0 < \omega < 1$ holds for $\tau \in [0, \infty)$, $m = 1$ holds only if all US and Canadian firms are completely attentive to the aggregate component of their marginal costs.

¹³To derive the stochastic process, we integrate (29) across good i . In aggregation, $\int_{i=0}^1 \ln q_{it} di = \ln q_t$ holds from the definition of the good-level real exchange rate. From the definition of q_{it} , $\ln q_{it} = \ln q_t + \ln p_{it}^* - \ln p_{it}$. For US relative prices, the integral of the relative price over i is zero because $\int_{i=0}^1 \ln p_{it} di = \int_{i=0}^1 \ln P_{it} di - \ln P_t = 0$. The same result holds for the Canadian relative price so that $\int_{i=0}^1 \ln p_{it}^* di = 0$. These results lead to $\int_{i=0}^1 \ln q_{it} di = \ln q_t$. The resulting equation is $\ln q_t = \lambda \ln q_{t-1} + (1 - \lambda)(1 - m) \ln q_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n$. Simplifying the above equation, we obtain (33).

price indexes.¹⁴ The friction allows the real shock ε_{it}^r to affect the good-level real exchange rate. Stressing the importance of real shocks, Crucini et al. (2010b, 2013) extended the Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) model to incorporate idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Under fully attentive rational expectations, their model implies:

$$\ln q_{it} = \lambda \ln q_{it-1} + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi\varepsilon_{it}^r. \quad (34)$$

This equation is a special case of (29) under $m = 1$. To understand the intuition behind the role of real shocks, again recall that $\ln q_{it} = \ln S_t + \ln P_{it}^* - \ln P_{it}$. Positive productivity shocks in the US firms producing good i reduce both P_{it}^* and P_{it} because the US firms sell their goods in both countries. However, the home bias generated by trade cost will decrease P_{it} more than P_{it}^* . This results in the appreciation of q_{it} . For the case of $0 < m < 1$, (33) continues to hold unless aggregate real shocks are introduced. In the process of aggregating the good-level real exchange rates, all idiosyncratic real shocks are washed out in the integral over i because $\int_{i=0}^1 \varepsilon_{it}^r di = 0$.

To summarize, behavioral inattention generates a new term that affects the good-level real exchange rate, namely, the aggregate real exchange rate. Time-dependent pricing models of the good-level and aggregate real exchange rates without behavioral inattention have been theoretically developed and empirically assessed by Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) and Crucini et al. (2010b, 2013), among many others. However, the importance of behavioral inattention has not been tested in the context of LOP deviations. In the next section, we use a rich international dataset on good-level real exchange rates to test the model of behavioral inattention.

4 A test of behavioral inattention

4.1 Methodology

In this section, we consider testing the null hypothesis of $m = 1$ (full attention), against the alternative hypothesis of $m < 1$ (partial attention). To derive our panel regression model, recall (29):

$$\ln q_{it} = \lambda \ln q_{it-1} + (1 - m)(1 - \lambda) \ln q_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi\varepsilon_{it}^r.$$

¹⁴Home bias is reflected in (25) and (27).

In this equation, the nominal shock ε_t^n in (29) is replaced by $\Delta \ln S_t$ because the (log) nominal exchange rate follows a random walk with an increment ε_t^n . Define $\ln \tilde{q}_{it} = \ln q_{it} - \lambda \ln q_{it-1} - \lambda \Delta \ln S_t = \ln \left[q_{it} / (q_{it-1} S_t / S_{t-1})^\lambda \right]$ and $\ln \tilde{q}_t = (1 - \lambda) \ln q_t = \ln(q_t / q_t^\lambda)$. Using these definitions, the above equation can be rewritten as

$$\ln \tilde{q}_{it} = (1 - m) \ln \tilde{q}_t + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi\varepsilon_{it}^r. \quad (35)$$

Our panel regression is given by

$$\ln \tilde{q}_{it} = \alpha + \beta \ln \tilde{q}_t + \gamma' X_{it} + u_{it}, \quad (36)$$

where α , β , and γ are regression coefficients, X_{it} is a vector of control variables, and u_{it} is the error term. To implement the regression, we rely on the micro evidence of λ to construct $\ln \tilde{q}_{it}$ and $\ln \tilde{q}_t$. The error term $u_{it} = (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi\varepsilon_{it}^r$ arises from an i.i.d. real shock and is uncorrelated with the regressor $\ln \tilde{q}_t = (1 - \lambda) \ln q_t$ because ε_{it}^r does not appear in (33). Therefore, we estimate (36) using ordinary least squares (OLS). The control variables X_{it} here include time-invariant fixed effects or other time-varying components, such as common productivity differentials across countries, which we discuss later.

The key idea is the equivalence of testing the full attention hypothesis and checking the statistical significance of the coefficient on $\ln \tilde{q}_t$ in (36) because (35) suggests that $\beta = 1 - m = 0$ if firms are fully attentive. When the null hypothesis of $\beta = 0$ is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of $\beta > 0$, the data are consistent with the presence of inattentive firms. Note that because the nominal exchange rate is the common driving force of the good-level and aggregate real exchange rates ($\ln q_{it}$ and $\ln q_t$), the two variables are expected to be highly correlated to each other. In our regression, however, both good-level and real exchange rates are modified so that two variables ($\ln \tilde{q}_{it}$ and $\ln \tilde{q}_t$) are correlated only when the degree of attention is less than unity. As an important byproduct of the regression (36), the degree of attention m can be obtained as $\hat{m} = 1 - \hat{\beta}$, where $\hat{\beta}$ is the OLS estimator of β .

The above regression analysis can be extended in two directions. First, we can generalize the stochastic process of labor productivity from a simple i.i.d. process to a more realistic process that allows for a nonstationary stochastic trend and a stationary but serially correlated component. Let us assume that labor productivity is given by:

$$\ln a_{it} = \xi_t + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (37)$$

$$\ln a_{it}^* = \xi_t + \eta_t^* + \varepsilon_{it}^*. \quad (38)$$

Here, the labor productivity consists of three components: a global component ξ_t , a country-specific component η_t (or η_t^*), and a good-specific component ε_{it} (or ε_{it}^*). In this generalized setting, global and country-specific components follow $\xi_t - \xi_{t-1} = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} b_j \varepsilon_{t-j}^{\xi}$, $\eta_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} d_j \varepsilon_{t-j}^{\eta}$, and $\eta_t^* = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} d_j \varepsilon_{t-j}^{\eta^*}$, respectively, where ε_t^{ξ} , ε_t^{η} , and $\varepsilon_t^{\eta^*}$ are i.i.d. shocks. This error structure implies that the productivities in both countries are nonstationary but share a common stochastic trend (or the two variables are cointegrated). Because only relative labor productivity $\ln a_{it} - \ln a_{it}^*$ matters in the dynamics of LOP deviations, the global component becomes irrelevant in our analysis. However, this is not the case for the country-specific component, in which case, regression (36) requires modification. For example, if η_t and η_t^* each follow an AR(1) process with AR coefficient ρ_{η} and firms are fully attentive to η_t and η_t^* , (35) is modified to

$$\ln \tilde{q}_{it} = (1 - m) \ln \tilde{q}_t + \frac{(1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)}{1 - \lambda\delta\rho_{\eta}} \psi \eta_t^r + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta) \psi \varepsilon_{it}^r, \quad (39)$$

where $\eta_t^r = \eta_t - \eta_t^*$. Equation (39) now includes the new control variable η_t^r and the coefficient on $\ln \tilde{q}_t$ remains unchanged. We can obtain a similar equation even if we include additional lags in the process of the country-specific component.

Second, we can drop the assumption of common λ and introduce heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness λ in testing the null hypothesis of $m = 1$. In particular, we can replace λ in $\ln \tilde{q}_{it} = \ln q_{it} - \lambda \ln q_{it-1} - \lambda \Delta \ln S_t$ and $\ln \tilde{q}_t^i = (1 - \lambda) \ln q_t$ with the good-specific λ_i . In the subsequent section of estimation results, we test the null hypothesis of $m = 1$ based on both cases of common λ and good-specific λ .

As a methodological remark, we emphasize that our regression framework of testing behavioral inattention (to the aggregate variable) remains valid even if we additionally introduce inattention into idiosyncratic productivity. The stochastic process for the good-level real exchange rate (29) needs to be slightly modified because $\ln q_{it}$ becomes less sensitive to ε_{it}^r . A smaller coefficient on ε_{it}^r in (29), however, does not change the coefficient on $\ln \tilde{q}_t$ and thus our regression equation (36) remains unchanged.

4.2 Data

We use the retail price data from the *Worldwide Cost of Living Survey* compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), which entails an extensive annual survey of international retail prices from a variety of cities. The survey reports all the prices of individual goods in local currency terms, conducted by a single agency in a consistent manner over time.

The coverage of goods and services is substantial in breadth and thus overlaps with the typical urban consumption basket tabulated by national statistical agencies.¹⁵ Recent studies using these data include Engel and Rogers (2004), Crucini and Shintani (2008), Bergin et al. (2013), Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), Andrade and Zachariadis (2016), Crucini and Landry (2019), and Crucini and Telmer (2020).

Our analysis focuses on the US–Canadian city pairs and the UK–Euro area city pairs. For the US–Canadian city pairs, the data contain the prices of 274 goods and services in multiple cities from 1990 to 2015. There are 16 US and four Canadian cities.¹⁶ This results in 64 unique cross-country city pairs. However, because some US cities have many missing values in the early 1990s, our data comprise an unbalanced panel.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the total number of observations available for our regressions exceeds 350,000. For the UK–Euro area city pairs, there are two UK cities and 18 Euro area cities.¹⁸ The data include 301 goods and services from 1990 to 2015. As in the US–Canadian city pairs, the panel is unbalanced. The number of observations exceeds 200,000 from the 36 UK–Euro area city pairs.

We compute the log of q_{ijt} for each year ($t = 1990, \dots, 2015$), each good ($i = 1, 2, \dots$), and each international city pair ($j = 1, 2, \dots$). The prices used to construct the good-level real exchange rates are the prices in a city expressed in the local currency unit. We use the spot nominal exchange rates from the EIU data to convert prices to common currency units. The EIU records the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar at the end of the week of the price survey. Thus, the nominal exchange rate may not necessarily be common across cities in the same country if the timing of the price survey differs across cities. We confirm that the timings of the price survey in Calgary differ from those in the remaining Canadian cities from 2003 to 2014.¹⁹ The nominal exchange rates in the cities of other countries are common in the EIU data.

Figure 1 plots two kernel density estimates of the bilateral good-level real exchange rates

¹⁵See Rogers (2007) for details on the comparison between the EIU data and the CPI data from national statistical agencies.

¹⁶The US cities are Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Honolulu, Houston, Lexington, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington DC. The Canadian cities are Calgary, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.

¹⁷In particular, the survey data in 1990 and 1991 do not include the price data of goods and services in Honolulu, whereas Lexington and Minneapolis have only been included in the list of cities since 1998.

¹⁸The UK cities are London and Manchester. The Euro area cities are Amsterdam, Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Dublin, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Helsinki, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Munich, Paris, Rome, and Vienna. We drop the data for Athens from the sample because inflation there in the 1990s before adopting the Euro exceeded 10 percent on average, substantially higher than in other Euro area countries. Likewise, we remove the data on Bratislava from the sample because the Slovak koruna to UK pound exchange rate greatly appreciated before the adoption of the Euro in 2009.

¹⁹As we discuss later, we adjust our regressions to account for this difference in timing.

pooling all goods and services, one for the first year of the sample (1990) and the other for the last year of the sample (2015). The upper panel of the figure shows the distribution of the good-level real exchange rates for the US–Canadian city pairs, and the lower panel shows those for the UK–Euro area city pairs. For our regressions and empirical tests that follow, we augment the micro price data with the aggregate bilateral real exchange rate computed from the official consumer price indices, which the EIU also reports.

When we allow for the general stochastic process of labor productivity (37) and (38), we need to control for the difference in the country-specific components in the labor productivity $\eta_t^r (= \eta_t - \eta_t^*)$ in (39). As a proxy for η_t^r , we utilize the difference in real GDP per hour worked between two countries from *OECD.Stat*.

Based on (36), we construct $\ln \tilde{q}_{ijt}$ and $\ln \tilde{q}_t$ and calibrate λ therein. We use values suggested by previous studies. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that the median frequency of price changes in the US is 8.7 percent. Gautier et al. (2022) find that the average frequency of price changes is 8.5 percent for consumer prices in the 11 Euro area countries.²⁰ We transform monthly frequencies of price changes into the *inf*frequencies of price changes at an annual rate to compute the value of λ . The transformation leads to a value of λ around 0.34 in both cases.²¹ Because the degree of price stickiness at the macroeconomic level is similar between the US and the Euro area countries, our regression (36) assumes that $\lambda = 0.34$.

When allowing for heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes, we require the monthly frequency of price changes for each good. For the US–Canadian city pairs, we use the good-specific monthly frequencies of price changes reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). They report the frequencies of price changes based on the Entry Level Item (ELI) of the CPI in the US. We match goods and services in the ELI with those in the EIU data and assign the monthly frequency of price changes to goods and services in the EIU data. For the UK–Euro area city pairs, we use the good-specific monthly frequencies of price changes calculated by Gautier et al. (2022). They calculate frequencies of price changes based on the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) and aggregate them using country weights of the Euro area consumer prices. As in the case of the US–Canadian city pairs, we assign the frequencies at the COICOP level to the EIU data.

²⁰Both Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Gautier et al. (2022) remove the impact of sales on the frequencies of price changes. In addition, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) remove the impact of product substitutions on the frequency of price changes.

²¹We transform the monthly frequency of price changes into the annual *inf*frequency of price changes as follows. Let f be the monthly frequency of price changes. If the price of a good is kept unchanged for 12 months under our assumption of sticky prices, the probability of not being able to change prices within a year is $(1 - f)^{12}$. We substitute $f = 0.087$ in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and $f = 0.085$ in Gautier et al. (2022) into the above formula.

4.3 Estimation results

Table 1 provides the estimation results of (36) for the test of behavioral inattention. The left panel shows the results for the US–Canadian city pairs, whereas the right panel presents those for the UK–Euro area city pairs. The table reports the estimated coefficients on $\ln \tilde{q}_t$ with the standard errors. We include the good-specific fixed effects in the regressions by default. This is because variations in the good-specific fixed effect are substantially larger in the LOP deviations than in the city-pair-specific fixed effect.²² For robustness, we allow for adding the city-pair-specific fixed effects to the regression and/or controlling for the country-specific component of labor productivity η_t^r , motivated by (39). In regressions for the US–Canadian city pairs, we also control for the difference in timing of the price survey in Calgary by adding dummy variables that take a value of one if a city pair includes Calgary in 2003, 2004, ..., or 2014.²³

Overall, $\hat{\beta}$ is around 0.85, or equivalently, the estimated degree of attention $\hat{m}(= 1 - \hat{\beta})$ is around 0.15. The standard error of the coefficient indicates that the test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of full attention ($\beta = 0$) against the alternative hypothesis of partial attention ($\beta > 0$).²⁴ Comparisons between the left and right panels reveal that the estimated coefficients on $\ln \tilde{q}_t$ for the US–Canadian city pairs are close to those for the UK–Euro area city pairs. Taking specification (1) as an example, the first row of Table 1 indicates that the estimated β is 0.84 for the US–Canadian city pairs whereas the estimated β is 0.86 for the UK–Euro area city pairs. Our results for the test of behavioral inattention are robust to the presence of city-pair-specific fixed effects (see specifications (2) and (4)) and to the inclusion of the log-difference in labor productivity as a control variable (see specifications (3) and (4)).²⁵ Interpreted through the lens of our theoretical model, these results suggest

²²Crucini and Telmer (2020) emphasize the importance of good-specific fixed effects using the analysis of variance of the EIU data.

²³The difference in timing of the price survey causes the aggregate real exchange rate to be city-pair- and year-specific. More specifically, let q_t^k and S_t^k be the aggregate real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate for a city pair k that involves Calgary in a year from 2003 to 2014. Here, $\ln q_t^k$ is given by $\ln q_t^k = \ln S_t^k + \ln P_t^* - \ln P_t$. We can express $\ln q_t^k$ as $\ln q_t^k = (\ln S_t^k - \ln S_t) + \ln q_t$ and $\ln q_{ijt}^k$ as $\ln q_{ijt}^k = (\ln S_t^k - \ln S_t) + \ln q_{ijt}$ where the variables without the superscript k are variables in the other city pairs. Therefore, this dummy variable can control for the presence of $\ln S_t^k - \ln S_t$ arising from the difference in timing of the price survey in Calgary.

²⁴We report the standard errors clustered by goods, but the null hypothesis is also rejected even if the standard errors are clustered by city pairs or years. Likewise, our main findings are robust, even if we replace λ with the values reported by previous studies on price dynamics such as Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) for the US–Canadian city pairs and Álvarez et al. (2006) for the UK–Euro area city pairs.

²⁵While we do not report the result to conserve the space, we also allow for a fixed effect specific to both good i and city pair j . We find that the estimated β is not significantly different.

that firms are not fully attentive to the aggregate components of marginal costs in making their pricing decisions. The bottom of the table also reports that the estimated degrees of attention, \hat{m}_t , are similar between the US–Canadian and the UK–Euro area city pairs. For example, in specification (1), $\hat{m} = 0.16$ in the US–Canadian city pairs and $\hat{m} = 0.14$ in the UK–Euro area city pairs.

Table 2 points to the estimation results when we drop the assumption of the common λ and introduce the heterogeneity of λ across goods.²⁶ Even when we allow for the good-specific degree of price stickiness, the null hypothesis of full attention is again significantly rejected. Regarding the estimated degrees of attention, \hat{m} tends to decline when we allow for the good-specific λ . For example, if we take specification (1) for comparison, \hat{m} reduces from 0.16 to 0.11 for the US–Canadian city pairs and from 0.14 to 0.13 for the UK–Euro area city pairs.

We confirm that the null hypothesis of full attention is robustly rejected. As we discuss in Appendix A.5, the null hypothesis is rejected in the case of the more general constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) form. In this case, the estimation equation becomes complicated, and a test of behavioral inattention requires an instrumental variables estimator.²⁷ Appendix A.5 derives the estimation equation together with the empirical results.

We also implement an alternative test for $m = 1$ as a robustness check. We regress $\ln q_{it}$ directly on $\ln q_t$ with additional regressors $\ln q_{it-1}$ and $\Delta \ln S_t$. The estimation equation is given by:

$$\ln q_{it} = \alpha + \beta \ln q_t + \gamma' X_{it} + u_{it}, \quad (40)$$

where β in (40) corresponds to $(1 - m)(1 - \lambda)$ in (29). The control variables X_{it} in (40) now include $\ln q_{it-1}$ and $\Delta \ln S_t$. Note that $\beta = (1 - m)(1 - \lambda) = 0$ corresponds to $m = 1$ provided $\lambda < 1$. Therefore, a test of $\beta = 0$ against $\beta > 0$ in (40) is equivalent to the test of the fully attentive hypothesis. In Appendix A.6, we discuss that full attention is not supported by the data.

²⁶See also Crucini et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2013), Hickey and Jacks (2011), and Elberg (2016) who emphasize heterogeneity in price stickiness in research on the LOP.

²⁷In the case of the more general CRRA form, firms expect a dynamic path for the labor supply from the time of price setting to the infinite future. As a result, the estimation equation includes the one-period ahead good-level real exchange rate and aggregate real exchange rate. Thus, our test requires the instrumental variable estimator because of the correlation of explanatory variables with forecast errors embedded in the error term.

5 Explaining the PPP puzzle

In the previous section, we provided strong evidence for behavioral inattention using micro price data. We now turn to the implications of this finding for the PPP puzzle.

5.1 Persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate

Let ρ_q be the first-order autocorrelation of aggregate real exchange rates. Because the AR coefficient in (33) corresponds to the first-order autocorrelation, let us rewrite (33) as:

$$\ln q_t = \rho_q \ln q_{t-1} + \rho_q \varepsilon_t^n, \quad (41)$$

where $\rho_q = \lambda/[1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda)]$. In the following proposition, we now discuss Rogoff's (1996) PPP puzzle.

Proposition 2 *Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 1,*

$$\rho_q \geq \lambda, \quad (42)$$

provided $m \in (0, 1]$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. The equality holds if and only if $m = 1$.

Proof. It follows from the fact that $(1 - m)(1 - \lambda) \leq 1$, where (42) holds with the equality if and only if $m = 1$. ■

Proposition 2 implies that the presence of behavioral inattention assists with the resolution of Rogoff's (1996) PPP puzzle. That is, the aggregate real exchange rate is more persistent than the degree of price stickiness implies. Without behavioral inattention (i.e., $m = 1$), ρ_q is equal to λ . However, if firms are inattentive (i.e., $m < 1$), ρ_q becomes strictly greater than λ . In the extreme case of $m \rightarrow 0$, the aggregate real exchange rate can even follow a random walk, as $\rho_q \rightarrow 1$. Therefore, even when the nominal frictions are small, the model with a small m can explain a highly persistent aggregate real exchange rate.

We rule out the case of flexible prices ($\lambda = 0$) in Propositions 1 and 2 because (41) suggests that $\lambda = 0$ leads to no PPP deviations, even in the short run (i.e., $\ln q_t = 0$ for all t). Our model thus requires nominal rigidities as the external source of the persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate. We can best appreciate this feature of our model in the context of real rigidities in Ball and Romer (1990) or strategic complementarity in Woodford (2003). Using a closed-economy model, Ball and Romer (1990) show that real rigidities are insufficient to create real effects of nominal shocks. They argue that a combination of real

rigidities and a small friction in the nominal price adjustment matters for the real effect of a nominal shock. In our model, a combination of behavioral inattention and a small friction in the nominal price adjustment matters for the persistent aggregate real exchange rate.

Figure 2 shows how the persistence of aggregate real exchange rate changes as m changes. The left panel plots ρ_q against $m \in (0, 1]$ when λ is calibrated at 0.34. For reference, the figure also plots the line of the lower bound of ρ_q : $\lambda = 0.34$. Starting from $\rho_q = \lambda$ when $m = 1$, ρ_q increases monotonically as m decreases. The persistence becomes closer to unity as m approaches zero. The right panel illustrates the ρ_q to λ ratio, which is defined as:

$$\frac{\rho_q}{\lambda} = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda)}. \quad (43)$$

This ratio measures the extent to which inattention amplifies the persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate explained solely by nominal rigidities under full attention. The figure indicates that the ρ_q to λ ratio can be quite large depending on m .

The estimated degrees of attention suggest that behavioral inattention makes the PPP deviations more than twice as persistent as what is predicted only by the degree of price stickiness. In the left panel of Figure 2, $\rho_q = 0.34$ if $m = 1$. However, the left panel of Figure 2 indicates that $\rho_q = 0.76$ if we employ $m = 0.16$ in specification (1) of Table 1 as a calibrated value for the US–Canadian city pairs. We also see from the right panel of the same figure that these calibrated values generate the ρ_q to λ ratio that exceeds two. In particular, the ρ_q to λ ratio is 2.24 when $m = 0.16$. When we take $m = 0.14$ using specification (1) of Table 1 for the UK–Euro area city pairs), ρ_q becomes 0.79 and the ρ_q to λ ratio is 2.31.

Let us evaluate the half-life of the aggregate real exchange rate. The upper panel of Table 3 compares the predicted half-lives of the aggregate real exchange rate with the half-lives observed in our data. Taking the aggregate real exchange rate used for our regressions, we estimate half-lives from the AR(1) model for $\ln q_t$.²⁸ As shown in the third column (headed “Data”), the observed half-life for the US–Canadian city pairs is 4.92 years. The aggregate real exchange rate for the UK–Euro area city pairs exhibits a lower half-life of 2.40 years.²⁹

How much can the estimated degree of inattention explain the observed persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate? Regarding the US–Canadian city pairs, the predicted half-life

²⁸We calculate the half-lives for the AR(1) process from the standard formula given by $-\ln(2)/\ln \rho$, where ρ is the AR(1) coefficient.

²⁹Note that we have multiple aggregate real exchange rates for the UK–Euro area city pairs because the consumer price indices differ across Euro area countries. The half-life of 2.40 years reported in Table 3 for the UK–Euro area city pairs results from the mean of the estimated half-lives in each country pair to which the UK–Euro area city pairs belong.

is 2.62 years when we use $m = 0.16$ in specification (1) in Table 1. In the second column of Table 3 (the column denoted by “95% CI”), we allow for estimation uncertainty of \hat{m} based on its standard errors. In this case, the predicted half-life for the US–Canadian city pairs ranges from 1.99 to 4.01 years. Thus, the predicted half-life under $m = 0.16$ falls short of the observed half-life of 4.92 years. However, if we use $m = 0.11$ in specification (1) of Table 2, the model is more successful than the previous case. In the present case, where m reduces to 0.11, the half-lives predicted by the model with behavioral inattention become longer. The predicted half-life is 3.70 years, and its range is from 2.52 to 7.61 years, which includes the observed half-life of 4.92 years.

For the UK–Euro area city pairs, the predicted half-life is 2.81 years ranging from 1.90 to 6.13 years when we use $m = 0.14$, the estimate in specification (1) of Table 1. The half-life predicted from the point estimate exceeds the observed half-life of 2.40 years. However, the range of the predicted half-life that allows for estimation uncertainty contains the observed half-life. Therefore, the model successfully explains the observed half-life for the UK–Euro area city pairs. We only observe a small reduction in \hat{m} from 0.14 to 0.13 when we use the estimate in specification (1) of Table 2. Thus, the model continues to explain the observed half-life for the UK–Euro area city pairs.

We emphasize that the model with behavioral inattention outperforms the model with full attention. When $m = 1$, the first-order autocorrelation of the aggregate real exchange rate is only 0.34 because $\rho_q = \lambda = 0.34$. This low persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate translates into a very short half-life of just 0.64 years. Given that the half-lives predicted from the point estimates are roughly three years, we conclude that behavioral inattention increases the half-life of aggregate real exchange rates by 2.4 years.

5.2 Persistence of the good-level real exchange rate

We next turn to the good-level real exchange rate. We let ρ_{qi} be the first-order autocorrelation of the good-level real exchange rate implied by (29). The following proposition describes the relationship between the persistence of the good-level real exchange rates and that of the aggregate real exchange rate, as predicted by the model.

Proposition 3 *Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 1,*

$$\rho_q \geq \rho_{qi}, \tag{44}$$

provided $m \in (0, 1], \lambda \in (0, 1), \tau \in [0, \infty), \varepsilon \in (1, \infty)$, and $\sigma_r/\sigma_n \in [0, \infty)$. The equality holds if $m = 1, \tau = 0$, or $\sigma_r/\sigma_n = 0$.

Proof. See Appendix A.7. ■

Proposition 3 explains the stylized fact that good-level real exchange rates are much less persistent than the aggregate real exchange rate. Importantly, we obtain this aggregation result without relying on the “aggregation bias” pointed out by Imbs et al. (2005). They emphasized that heterogeneity in the persistence of the good-level real exchange rates induces a positive bias in the persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate. Using multisector sticky-price models with heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness, Carvalho and Nechio (2011) successfully explain the positive bias. By contrast, our model intentionally assumes homogeneity in the persistence across goods. Nevertheless, our model can qualitatively explain the gap in persistence between the aggregate and the good-level real exchange rates.

Once again, the value of m plays a crucial role in generating the gap between ρ_q and ρ_{qi} . This point can be further investigated from the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio defined by:

$$\frac{\rho_q}{\rho_{qi}} = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda) \frac{A}{1+A}}, \quad (45)$$

where

$$A = (1 - \lambda)^2 (1 - \lambda \delta)^2 \psi^2 \frac{1 - \rho_q^2}{\rho_q^2 (1 - \lambda^2)} \left(\frac{\sigma_r}{\sigma_n} \right)^2. \quad (46)$$

The derivation is in Appendix A.7. Similar to the ρ_q to λ ratio in (43), the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio indicates that $\rho_q = \rho_{qi}$ if $m = 1$. Therefore, combined with the result from (43), full attention leads to the complete failure to explain the PPP puzzle: $\rho_q = \rho_{qi} = \lambda$.

While the behavioral inattention ($m < 1$) is necessary for $\rho_{qi} < \rho_q$, it is not sufficient for explaining the gap between ρ_q and ρ_{qi} . What is additionally needed is real friction. More specifically, trade cost (τ) needs to be strictly positive and the elasticity of substitution across brands (ε) needs to be larger than one for the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio (45) to be strictly greater than one. If $\tau = 0$ or $\varepsilon \rightarrow 1$, there is no home bias ($\omega = 1 / (1 + (1 + \tau)^{1-\varepsilon}) = 1/2$) so that $\psi = 2\omega - 1 = 0$. According to (46), either $\tau = 0$ or $\varepsilon \rightarrow 1$ makes A zero and thus (45) becomes one. Likewise, σ_r/σ_n , namely the standard deviation ratio of real shocks (ε_{it}^r) to nominal shocks (ε_t^n), in (46) needs to be strictly positive. If the nominal shock fully dominates the real shock such that $\sigma_r/\sigma_n \rightarrow 0$, A is again zero, such that the model fails to generate the gap between ρ_q and ρ_{qi} .

To assess the effect of m on the gap between ρ_q and ρ_{qi} , we calibrate the parameters in

(45) and (46). For the parameters of real frictions, we set τ to 74 percent from Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and ε to 4 from Broda and Weinstein (2006).^{30,31} Using these values, we obtain the degree of home bias ω of 0.84, which is roughly consistent with the parameter for home bias used in the literature.³² The resulting calibrated value of ψ becomes 0.68. Crucini et al. (2013) found that $\sigma_r/\sigma_n = 5$ is a sensible estimate of the standard deviation ratio, based on the sectoral real exchange rate data in Europe. The households' discount factor δ is set to 0.98, and the degree of price stickiness λ is again set to 0.34.

Figure 3 illustrates the extent to which the good-level real exchange rate becomes less persistent than the aggregate real exchange rate against the degree of attention. The left panel plots ρ_{qi} against $m \in (0, 1]$ in the dashed line. It also includes the curve for ρ_q taken from the solid line in Figure 2. As suggested by Proposition 3, the curve for ρ_{qi} is always located below the curve for ρ_q . Recall that the lower bound of ρ_q is $\lambda (= 0.34)$ at $m = 1$. This property is preserved for ρ_{qi} because $\rho_q = \rho_{qi} = \lambda$ hold at $m = 1$. The right panel represents the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio along with the lower bound of unity. The panel indicates that the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio is hump shaped against $m \in (0, 1]$. The ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio is one when $m \rightarrow 0$ or $m = 1$. We reconfirm this from the left panel of the same figure. When m is either zero or one, we have $\rho_q = \rho_{qi}$ so that $\rho_q/\rho_{qi} = 1$ holds.³³ However, when $0 < m < 1$, the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio exceeds unity.

The estimated degrees of attention suggest that inattention reduces the persistence of the good-level real exchange rate to less than two-thirds of that of the aggregate real exchange rate. Suppose that $m = 0.16$, which is the estimated degree of attention in the US–Canadian city pairs. The left panel of Figure 3 shows that ρ_{qi} is around 0.49 whereas ρ_q is 0.76. The right panel indicates that the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio is 1.55. Equivalently, ρ_{qi} is less than two-thirds of ρ_q (i.e., $0.49/0.76 < 2/3$). We confirm that the estimated degree of attention in the UK–Euro area city pairs generates similar results. When $m = 0.14$, $\rho_{qi} = 0.51$, $\rho_q = 0.79$. Thus, our model predicts that ρ_{qi} is also less than two-thirds of ρ_q ($0.51/0.79 < 2/3$) in the UK–Euro area city pairs.

³⁰Using US data, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue that the transportation costs are 21 percent and that the border-related trade barriers are 44 percent. Using these values, they calculate total international trade costs as $0.74 (= 1.21 \times 1.44 - 1)$.

³¹Broda and Weinstein (2006) report that the medians of the elasticities of substitution during 1990–2001 are 3.1 at the seven-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) and 2.7 at the five-digit level of the SITC.

³²For example, Chari et al. (2002) calibrate the degree of home bias as 0.76, whereas Steinsson (2008) uses 0.94.

³³Analytically, the results can be understood as follows. When $m = 1$, $\rho_q/\rho_{qi} = 1$ immediately follows from (45). When $m \rightarrow 0$, $\rho_q \rightarrow 1$ holds from the definition of $\rho_q = \lambda/[1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda)]$. As $\rho_q \rightarrow 1$, $A \rightarrow 0$, which leads to $\rho_q/\rho_{qi} \rightarrow 1$.

The lower panel of Table 3 presents the predicted half-lives of the good-level real exchange rate, together with the half-lives observed in the data. The rightmost column reports the median half-lives of the good-level real exchange rates estimated from our dataset.³⁴ In the data over 1990–2015, we find that the half-life of the median goods is 1.61 years for the US–Canadian city pairs and 1.18 years for the UK–Euro area city pairs, both of which are much shorter than the half-lives of the aggregate real exchange rate shown in the same column of the upper panel. The estimated half-lives are also consistent with previous studies using EIU data. For example, Crucini and Shintani (2008) find the half-life of median goods to range from 1.03 to 1.61 years based on the EIU data from 1990–2005. Bergin et al. (2013) also use the EIU data and construct the good-level real exchange rates of 20 cities in industrial countries (including 16 European cities) relative to New York City between 1990 and 2007. When they estimate the AR(1) model for the good-level real exchange rates, the average half-life is 1.15 years.

How much can the estimated degree of inattention explain the observed persistence of the good-level real exchange rates? For the US–Canadian city pairs, $m = 0.16$ (the estimate from specification (1) of Table 1) is again insufficient to explain the observed half-life of the good-level real exchange rate for the US–Canadian city pairs. The predicted half-life is 0.98 years and ranges between 0.85 and 1.29 years. The range of predicted half-life that allows for estimation uncertainty thus falls short of the observed half-life of 1.61 years. However, the model under $m = 0.11$ successfully explains the data for the US–Canadian city pairs. Recall that in the previous section, we observed that the reduction in m increased the predicted half-life of the aggregate real exchange rate. This result also applies to the good-level real exchange rate. In particular, when m decreases from 0.16 to 0.11, the half-life for the US–Canadian city pairs is now 1.22 years rather than 0.98 years, and the range of the predicted half-life includes the observed half-life of 1.61 years.

For the UK–Euro area city pairs, the predicted half-lives are 1.02 under $m = 0.14$ and 1.07 years under $m = 0.13$. In both cases, the range of the predicted half-life contains the observed half-life, so the model explains the persistence of the good-level real exchange rates fairly well.

Before closing this section, two remarks are in order. First, it is straightforward to combine

³⁴We estimate the panel AR(1) model of $\ln q_{ijt}$ for each good i , using the generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). The first-order autocorrelation estimated from the panel AR(1) model is transformed into the half-life. Typically, the good-by-good panel consists of more than 1,400 observations in the US–Canadian city pairs and more than 700 observations for the UK–Euro area city pairs. Our median half-lives reported in Table 3 are calculated from half-lives in which the number of observations exceeds 500 for the US–Canadian city pairs or 250 for the UK–Euro area city pairs.

Propositions 2 and 3 to obtain the ρ_{qi} to λ ratio that measures the amplification from λ to ρ_{qi} . In particular, using (43) and (45), we have

$$\frac{\rho_{qi}}{\lambda} = \frac{1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda) \left(\frac{A}{1+A}\right)}{1 - (1 - m)(1 - \lambda)} \geq 1. \quad (47)$$

As long as $A > 0$ and $m < 1$, the persistence of the good-level real exchange rate exceeds λ . The result is also consistent with Kehoe and Midrigan's (2007) finding that even the persistence of the good-level real exchange rate is more persistent than what is predicted only by the degree of price stickiness. Together with the result from (45), we can summarize the relationship as $\rho_q > \rho_{qi} > \lambda$.

Second, our model of behavioral inattention can reproduce the findings by Bergin et al. (2013), who analyze the persistence of good-level real exchange rate *conditional on shocks*. Using a vector error correction model for each good, they find that the good-level real exchange rate is as persistent as the aggregate real exchange rate, conditional on macroeconomic shock. We can analyze \hat{q}_{it} conditional on macroeconomic shock by setting $\sigma_r = 0$. As we discuss earlier, $\sigma_r = 0$ implies $A = 0$. Therefore, (45) and (47) implies that $\rho_q = \rho_{qi} > \lambda$, which is consistent with the empirical finding by Bergin et al. (2013).

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we explain two empirical anomalies. First, observed PPP deviations are much more persistent than the theoretical predictions given by the standard model of nominal rigidities in prices. Second, the micro price evidence suggests that the deviations from the LOP are often less persistent than the PPP deviations. To reconcile the PPP and LOP evidence, we adapted the model of behavioral inattention in Gabaix (2014) to a simple two-country, sticky-price model. We showed that pricing by inattentive firms generates the complementarity between the LOP and PPP deviations, which is the key to accounting for the puzzling behavior of real exchange rates.

Using international price data, we implemented a test of behavioral inattention and quantified its importance. We found strong evidence consistent with behavioral inattention. The complementarity in our model with behavioral inattention produces an aggregate real exchange rate that is more than twice as persistent as the real exchange rate explained only by sticky prices. Our model also predicts that the persistence of the LOP deviations is less than two-thirds of the persistence of the PPP deviations. We showed that the model quantitatively

replicates the observed half-lives of both the aggregate and the good-level real exchange rates.

Based upon our examination of the behavioral inattention hypothesis, it seems plausible that it plays a comparable role to other real rigidities in the existing real exchange rate literature while also amplifying some prominent existing mechanisms such as sticky prices. The avenues for further exploration appear to be quite promising.

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A Appendix

A.1 The derivation of the objective function for the pricing decision

To derive (6) and (7), we begin with the standard expression.³⁵ The objective function of US firms that sell their brand in US markets is given by:

$$v_{it}(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} (1/P_{t+k}) \left[P_{it}(z) - \frac{W_{t+k}}{a_{it+k}} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z), \quad (48)$$

subject to the demand function by US consumers for brand z of good i conditional on the firm having last reset its price in period t :

$$c_{it,t+k}(z) = \left[\frac{P_{it}(z)}{P_{it+k}} \right]^{-\varepsilon} c_{it+k}, \quad (49)$$

where $z \in [0, 1/2]$. Using the definitions of $p_{it}(z)$, w_t , and p_{it} , we rewrite (48) as:

$$v_{it}(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \left[p_{it}(z) - \frac{w_{t+k} P_{t+k}}{a_{it+k} P_t} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z). \quad (50)$$

³⁵For example, see Galí (2015).

For a generic variable x_t , we express x_t as $x_t = \bar{x} \exp(\hat{x}_t)$, where $\hat{x}_t = \ln x_t - \ln \bar{x}$ and \bar{x} is the steady-state value of x_t . In addition, by assumption, P_{t+k}/P_t and a_{it} are both unity in the steady state. Rewriting (50) yields (6):

$$v_{it}(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \left[\bar{p}_i(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}(z)] - \bar{w} \exp\left(\hat{w}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} \pi_{t+l} - \hat{a}_{it+k}\right) \right] c_{it,t+k}(z),$$

where $P_{t+k}/P_t = \prod_{l=1}^k P_{t+l}/P_{t+l-1} = \exp\left[\sum_{l=1}^k \ln(P_{t+l}/P_{t+l-1})\right] = \exp\left[\sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}\right]$. For the demand function, we can rewrite (49) as $c_{it,t+k}(z) = [P_{it}(z)/P_{it+k}]^{-\varepsilon} c_{it+k} = [(P_{it}(z)/P_t)/(P_{it+k}/P_{t+k}) \times (P_t/P_{t+k})]^{-\varepsilon} c_{it+k} = [(p_{it}(z)/p_{it+k})(P_t/P_{t+k})]^{-\varepsilon} c_{it+k}$. Using the log deviation, we can derive (7):

$$c_{it,t+k}(z) = \left(\frac{\bar{p}_i(z)}{\bar{p}_i}\right)^{-\varepsilon} \exp\left\{-\varepsilon \left[\hat{p}_{it}(z) - \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l} - \hat{p}_{it+k}\right]\right\} c_{it+k}. \quad (51)$$

We next work on the derivation of (8) and (9). When US firms sell their brands in Canadian markets, they set the price in the local currency. Under this assumption, the objective function of these firms is

$$v_{it}^*(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} (1/P_{t+k}) \left[S_{t+k} P_{it}^*(z) - (1 + \tau) \frac{W_{t+k}}{a_{it+k}} \right] c_{it+k}^*(z), \quad (52)$$

subject to the demand function by Canadian consumers:

$$c_{it+k}^*(z) = \left[\frac{P_{it}^*(z)}{P_{it+k}^*} \right]^{-\varepsilon} c_{it+k}^*, \quad (53)$$

where $z \in [0, 1/2]$.

Using the definitions of $p_{it}^*(z) = P_{it}^*(z)/P_t^*$ and $p_{it}^* = P_{it}^*/P_t^*$, we rewrite (52) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{it}^*(z) &= \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} \frac{S_{t+k} P_{t+k}^*}{P_{t+k}} \left[\frac{P_{it}^*(z)}{P_t^*} \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} - (1 + \tau) \frac{P_{t+k}}{S_{t+k} P_{t+k}^*} \frac{W_{t+k}/P_{t+k}}{a_{it+k}} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z) \\ &= \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} q_{t+k} \left[p_{it}^*(z) \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} - (1 + \tau) \frac{w_{t+k}}{q_{t+k} a_{it+k}} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z) \\ &= \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} q_{t+k} \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} \left[p_{it}^*(z) - (1 + \tau) \frac{w_{t+k}}{q_{t+k} a_{it+k}} \frac{P_{t+k}^*}{P_t^*} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z). \end{aligned}$$

Again, using $x_t = \bar{x} \exp(\hat{x}_t)$ and assuming the zero-inflation steady state, we obtain (8):

$$v_{it}^*(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k} q_{t+k} \\ \times \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} \left\{ \bar{p}_i^*(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}^*(z)] - (1 + \tau) \frac{\bar{w}}{\bar{q}} \exp \left(\hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{q}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}^* - \hat{a}_{it+k} \right) \right\} c_{it,t+k}(z).$$

Equation (9) can be derived from (53) in the same way as the derivation of (7) from (49).

We can similarly derive the objective function of Canadian firms indexed by $z \in (1/2, 1]$.

When Canadian firms sell their brands in Canadian markets, their objective function is

$$v_{it}^*(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* (1/P_{t+k}^*) \left[P_{it}^*(z) - \frac{W_{t+k}^*}{a_{it+k}^*} \right] c_{it,t+k}^*(z) \\ = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} \left[p_{it}^*(z) - \frac{w_{t+k}^*}{a_{it+k}^*} \left(\frac{P_{t+k}^*}{P_t^*} \right) \right] c_{it,t+k}^*(z) \\ = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}^*} \left[\bar{p}_i^*(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}^*(z)] - \bar{w}^* \exp \left(\hat{w}_{t+k}^* + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l} - \hat{a}_{it+k}^* \right) \right] c_{it,t+k}^*(z),$$

for $z \in (1/2, 1]$. Similarly, when Canadian firms sell their brands in US markets, the objective function is

$$v_{it}(z) = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* (1/P_{t+k}^*) \left[\frac{P_{it}(z)}{S_{t+k}} - (1 + \tau) \frac{W_{t+k}^*}{a_{it+k}^*} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z) \\ = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* \left(\frac{P_{t+k}}{S_{t+k} P_{t+k}^*} \right) \left[\frac{P_{it}(z)}{P_t} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} - (1 + \tau) \frac{W_{t+k}^*/P_{t+k}^*}{a_{it+k}^*} \frac{S_{t+k} P_{t+k}^*}{P_{t+k}} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z) \\ = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* q_{t+k}^{-1} \left[p_{it}(z) \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} - (1 + \tau) \frac{w_{t+k}^* q_{t+k}}{a_{it+k}^*} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z) \\ = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* q_{t+k}^{-1} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \left[p_{it}(z) - (1 + \tau) \frac{w_{t+k}^* q_{t+k}}{a_{it+k}^*} \frac{P_{t+k}}{P_t} \right] c_{it,t+k}(z) \\ = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k \delta_{t,t+k}^* q_{t+k}^{-1} \\ \times \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \left\{ \bar{p}_i(z) \exp[\hat{p}_{it}(z)] - (1 + \tau) \bar{w}^* \bar{q} \exp \left(\hat{w}_{t+k} + \hat{q}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l} - \hat{a}_{it+k} \right) \right\} c_{it,t+k}(z),$$

for $z \in (1/2, 1]$.

A.2 The sparse max

Following Gabaix (2014), we assume that firms choose the degree of attention. Equations (13) and (14) correspond to the case of US firms that sell their goods in the US market. The US firms' objective function for choosing m_H is based on the second-order Taylor expansion of $\mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] - \mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1]$ around $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht} = \mathbf{0}$, which is the loss of profits of choosing the price distorted by partial attention. In this appendix, we derive (13) and (14).

To obtain (13) and (14), we first take the approximation of $\mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1]$ around $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht} = \mathbf{0}$. Here, the profit of the firm is evaluated at $m_H = 1$ (which appears in the last argument in $v_{Hi}(\cdot)$), but the price is distorted by $m_H \neq 1$. We next evaluate the price in the approximated equation at $m_H = 1$. The second-order approximation of $\mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1]$ around $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht} = \mathbf{0}$ is

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] \\ & \simeq v_{Hi}^0 + \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} \left[\frac{\partial \hat{p}_{Hit}(\mathbf{0}, m_H)}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}} \right]^2 + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2} \right\} \mathbb{E}\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2 \\ & + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z) \partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}} \left[\frac{\partial \hat{p}_{Hit}(\mathbf{0}, m_H)}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}} \right] \mathbb{E}\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2, \end{aligned} \quad (54)$$

where $v_{Hi}^0 = v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1]_{\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}=\mathbf{0}} = v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{Hi}(\mathbf{0}, m_H), \mathbf{0}, 1)$. For the second derivatives, $\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0 / \partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2 = \partial^2 v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{Hi}(\mathbf{0}, m_H), \mathbf{0}, 1) / \partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2$ and $\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0 / \partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2 = \partial^2 v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{Hi}(\mathbf{0}, m_H), \mathbf{0}, 1) / \partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2$.

We use the first-order condition for pricing of inattentive firms to simplify (54). The first-order condition is $\partial v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{it}(z), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H] / \partial \hat{p}_{it}(z) = 0$. Taking the partial derivative of the first-order conditions with respect to $\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}$ for $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ and evaluating them at $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht} = \mathbf{0}$:

$$\frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{Hit}(\mathbf{0}, m_H), \mathbf{0}, m_H)}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z) \partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}} = - \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}(\hat{p}_{Hit}(\mathbf{0}, m_H), \mathbf{0}, m_H)}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} \frac{\partial \hat{p}_{Hit}(\mathbf{0}, m_H)}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}}, \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, \dots \quad (55)$$

Let us focus on $\partial \hat{p}_{Hit}(\mathbf{0}, m_H) / \partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}$ in the right-hand side of (55). The optimal price is given by $\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = m_H \hat{w}_t - (1 - \lambda\delta) \hat{a}_{it} = m_H \hat{\mu}_{Ht} - (1 - \lambda\delta) \hat{a}_{it}$ (see (20)). Thus,

$$\frac{\partial \hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H)}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}} = \begin{cases} m_H & \text{for } k = 0 \\ 0 & \text{for } k \neq 0 \end{cases} \quad (56)$$

When we evaluate the profits in (55) at $m_H = 1$ but not the prices, (55) can be substituted

into (54). Then, together with (56), we now simplify (54) to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] \\ \simeq & v_{Hi}^0 + \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} m_H^2 - 2 \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} m_H \right] \mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}^2) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2} \mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2). \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

We further need the second-order approximation of $\mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1]$ where the price is not distorted by m_H . Evaluating (57) at $m_H = 1$ yields

$$\mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] \simeq v_{Hi}^0 - \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} \right] \mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}^2) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2} \mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}^2). \quad (58)$$

Combining (57) and (58), $\mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] - \mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1]$ around $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht} = 0$ is

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] - \mathbb{E}v_{Hi}[\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1), \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, 1] \\ \simeq & \frac{1}{2} (m_H^2 - 2m_H + 1) \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} \mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}^2) \\ = & \frac{1}{2} (1 - m_H)^2 \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^0}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}(z)^2} \mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}^2) \\ = & -\frac{1}{2} (1 - m_H)^2 \Lambda_H, \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

where we used (14) for the last equality.

Although firms can reduce the loss of paying partial attention (59) by paying more attention, they also have to pay costs of increasing attention, which we specify as a quadratic cost function $\mathcal{C}(m_H) = (\kappa/2)m_H^2$. Formally, the choice of attention for US firms that sell their goods in US markets is characterized by:

$$\min_{m_H \in [0,1]} \frac{1}{2} [(1 - m_H)^2 \Lambda_H] + \frac{\kappa}{2} m_H^2, \text{ where } \Lambda_H = - \left\{ \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}}{\partial \hat{p}_{it}^2(z)} [0, \mathbf{0}, 1] \right\} Var(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}).$$

The remaining sparse max can analogously be defined. The sparse max for US firms selling their goods in Canadian markets is

$$\min_{m_H^* \in [0,1]} \frac{1}{2} (1 - m_H^*)^2 \Lambda_H^* + \frac{\kappa}{2} (m_H^*)^2, \text{ where } \Lambda_H^* = - \left\{ \frac{\partial^2 v_{Hi}^*[0, \mathbf{0}, 1]}{\partial \hat{p}_{Hit}^{*2}} \right\} Var(\hat{\mu}_{Ht}^*).$$

Next, the sparse max for Canadian firms selling their goods in Canadian markets is

$$\min_{m_F^* \in [0,1]} \frac{1}{2}(1 - m_F^*)^2 \Lambda_F^* + \frac{\kappa}{2}(m_F^*)^2, \text{ where } \Lambda_F^* = - \left\{ \frac{\partial^2 v_{Fi}^*[0, \mathbf{0}, 1]}{\partial \hat{p}_{Fit}^{*2}} \right\} \text{Var}(\hat{\mu}_{Ft}^*).$$

By symmetry, we can easily show that $\Lambda_F^* = \Lambda_H$, which reconfirms $m_F^* = m_H$. the sparse max for Canadian firms selling their goods in US markets is

$$\min_{m_F \in [0,1]} \frac{1}{2}(1 - m_F)^2 \Lambda_F + \frac{\kappa}{2}m_F^2, \text{ where } \Lambda_F = - \left\{ \frac{\partial^2 v_{Fi}[0, \mathbf{0}, 1]}{\partial \hat{p}_{Fit}^2} \right\} \text{Var}(\hat{\mu}_{Ft}).$$

Again, by symmetry, we have $\Lambda_F = \Lambda_H^*$ and $m_F = m_H^*$.

A.3 The optimal prices under behavioral inattention

Using the definition of $\hat{\mu}_{Ht+k}$, we rewrite the log-linearized first-order condition (19) as

$$p_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = (1 - \lambda\delta)\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k (m_H \hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{a}_{it+k}) + m_H (1 - \lambda\delta)\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}, \quad (60)$$

where we used $\mu_{Ht+k} = \hat{w}_{t+k} + \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l}$.

We separately arrange the terms in the right-hand side of (60). First, note that

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \lambda\delta)\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k (m_H \hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{a}_{it+k}) \\ = & \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k (m_H \hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{a}_{it+k}) - \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^{k+1} (m_H \hat{w}_{t+k} - \hat{a}_{it+k}) \\ = & m_H \hat{w}_t - \hat{a}_{it} \\ & + \mathbb{E}_t [(\lambda\delta)^1 (m_H \hat{w}_{t+1} - \hat{a}_{it+1}) - (\lambda\delta)^1 (m_H \hat{w}_t - \hat{a}_{it})] \\ & + \mathbb{E}_t [(\lambda\delta)^2 (m_H \hat{w}_{t+2} - \hat{a}_{it+2}) - (\lambda\delta)^2 (m_H \hat{w}_{t+1} - \hat{a}_{it+1})] \\ & + \dots \\ = & m_H \hat{w}_t - \hat{a}_{it} + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k (m_H \Delta \hat{w}_{t+k} - \Delta a_{it+k}). \end{aligned}$$

Next, the remaining terms are

$$\begin{aligned}
& m_H(1 - \lambda\delta)\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \sum_{l=1}^k \pi_{t+l} \\
&= m_H(1 - \lambda\delta)\mathbb{E}_t \left[\begin{array}{l} (\lambda\delta)\pi_{t+1} \\ +(\lambda\delta)^2\pi_{t+1} + (\lambda\delta)^2\pi_{t+2} \\ +(\lambda\delta)^3\pi_{t+1} + (\lambda\delta)^3\pi_{t+2} + (\lambda\delta)^3\pi_{t+3} \\ +\dots \end{array} \right] \\
&= m_H(1 - \lambda\delta)\mathbb{E}_t \left\{ (\lambda\delta) \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \right] \pi_{t+1} + (\lambda\delta)^2 \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \right] \pi_{t+2} + (\lambda\delta)^3 \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \right] \pi_{t+3} + \dots \right\} \\
&= m_H\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \pi_{t+k},
\end{aligned}$$

where the last line uses $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k = (1 - \lambda\delta)^{-1}$. Finally, combining the above expressions, (60) becomes

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = (m_H\hat{w}_t - \hat{a}_{it}) + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \{m_H(\Delta\hat{w}_{t+k} + \pi_{t+k}) - \Delta\hat{a}_{it+k}\}. \quad (61)$$

Now, under the assumption of $U(c, n) = \ln c - \chi n$, the first-order conditions of US households ($W_t/P_t = \chi c_t$) imply $\hat{w}_t = \hat{c}_t$. In addition, their CIA constraint ($M_t = P_t c_t$) leads to $\pi_t = \ln M_t/M_{t-1} - \Delta\hat{c}_t$. Thus, using (15), we have $\Delta\hat{w}_t + \pi_t = \ln M_t/M_{t-1} = \varepsilon_t^M$. As a result, (61) becomes

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = (m_H\hat{w}_t - \hat{a}_{it}) - \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \Delta a_{it+k}.$$

If the stochastic process \hat{a}_{it} is given by (17), $\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k \Delta a_{it+k} = -\lambda\delta\hat{a}_{it}$. Therefore,

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) = m_H\hat{w}_t - (1 - \lambda\delta)\hat{a}_{it},$$

which is (20) in the main text.

For the price of goods exported by US firms, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_H^*) &= [m_H^*(\hat{w}_t - \hat{q}_t) - \hat{a}_{it}] + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k [m_H(\Delta\hat{w}_{t+k} - \Delta\hat{q}_{t+k} + \pi_{t+k}^*) - \Delta\hat{a}_{it+k}] \\
&= (m_H^*\hat{w}_t^* - \hat{a}_{it}) + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda\delta)^k [m_H(\Delta\hat{w}_{t+k}^* + \pi_{t+k}^*) - \Delta\hat{a}_{it+k}], \quad (62)
\end{aligned}$$

where we used the log-linearized equation of (3): $\hat{q}_t = \hat{c}_t - \hat{c}_t^* = \hat{w}_t - \hat{w}_t^*$. This equation has

the same structure as (61). Using the CIA constraint, (16), and (17), the above equation can be simplified to

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_H^*) = m_H^*(\hat{w}_t - \hat{q}_t) - (1 - \lambda\delta)\hat{a}_{it},$$

which is equivalent to (21).

The remaining optimal prices, namely $\hat{p}_{Fi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}^*, m_F^*)$ and $\hat{p}_{Fi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}, m_F)$ are analogously derived.

A.4 Proof of Proposition 1

We begin by (28), $\hat{q}_{it} = \hat{q}_t + \hat{p}_{it}^* - \hat{p}_{it}$. From (3), the log deviation of the real exchange rate is

$$\hat{q}_t = \hat{c}_t - \hat{c}_t^*. \quad (63)$$

Thus, \hat{q}_{it} can be rewritten as:

$$\hat{q}_{it} = (\hat{p}_{it}^* - \hat{c}_t^*) - (\hat{p}_{it} - \hat{c}_t). \quad (64)$$

In what follows, we focus on $\hat{p}_{it} - \hat{c}_t$ and $\hat{p}_{it}^* - \hat{c}_t^*$ to derive (29). Equation (24) implies

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_{it} - \hat{c}_t &= \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1} - \pi_t) + (1 - \lambda)\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \hat{c}_t \\ &= \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1} - \hat{c}_{t-1}) - \lambda(\Delta\hat{c}_t + \pi_t) + (1 - \lambda)(\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \hat{c}_t). \end{aligned} \quad (65)$$

Note that $\Delta\hat{c}_t + \pi_t$ in (65) is equal to ε_t^M because of the CIA constraint of US households and the money supply process (15). Substituting this result yields

$$\hat{p}_{it} - \hat{c}_t = \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1} - \hat{c}_{t-1}) - \lambda\varepsilon_t^M + (1 - \lambda)(\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \hat{c}_t). \quad (66)$$

Similarly, $\hat{p}_{it}^* - \hat{c}_t^*$ is given by:

$$\hat{p}_{it}^* - \hat{c}_t^* = \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1}^* - \hat{c}_{t-1}^*) - \lambda\varepsilon_t^{M*} + (1 - \lambda)(\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \hat{c}_t^*). \quad (67)$$

Substituting (66) and (67) into (64) yields an expression for \hat{q}_{it} :

$$\hat{q}_{it} = \lambda\hat{q}_{it-1} + \lambda\varepsilon_t^n + (1 - \lambda) [(\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \hat{c}_t^*) - (\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \hat{c}_t)], \quad (68)$$

where $\varepsilon_t^n = \varepsilon_t^M - \varepsilon_t^{M*}$.

We next focus on the expression inside the bracket on the right-hand side of (68). Using (20), (23), (25), and (63), we rewrite \hat{p}_{it}^{opt} as

$$\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} = m\hat{c}_t - (1 - \lambda\delta)[\omega\hat{a}_{it} + (1 - \omega)\hat{a}_{it}^*], \quad (69)$$

where the relative price index is determined by the aggregate demand \hat{c}_t and the weighted average of labor productivity. In the equation, we also use the degree of attention m defined by (30). We then subtract \hat{c}_t from both sides of (69) to get

$$\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \hat{c}_t = -(1 - m)\hat{c}_t - (1 - \lambda\delta)[\omega\hat{a}_{it} + (1 - \omega)\hat{a}_{it}^*]. \quad (70)$$

Similarly, $\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \hat{c}_t^*$ is

$$\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \hat{c}_t^* = -(1 - m)\hat{c}_t^* - (1 - \lambda\delta)[\omega\hat{a}_{it}^* + (1 - \omega)\hat{a}_{it}], \quad (71)$$

where $m = \omega m_F^* + (1 - \omega)m_H^* = \omega m_H + (1 - \omega)m_F$. Combining (70) and (71), we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \hat{c}_t^*) - (\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \hat{c}_t) &= (1 - m)(\hat{c}_t - \hat{c}_t^*) + (1 - \lambda\delta)(2\omega - 1)(\hat{a}_{it} - \hat{a}_{it}^*) \\ &= (1 - m)\hat{q}_t + (1 - \lambda\delta)\psi\varepsilon_{it}^r, \end{aligned}$$

where $\hat{q}_t = \hat{c}_t - \hat{c}_t^*$ from (63), $\varepsilon_{it}^r = \varepsilon_{it} - \varepsilon_{it}^* = a_{it} - a_{it}^*$ from (17) and (18), and $\psi = 2\omega - 1$.

Substituting the above equation into (68) yields

$$\hat{q}_{it} = \lambda\hat{q}_{it-1} + (1 - \lambda)(1 - m)\hat{q}_t + \lambda\varepsilon_{it}^n + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi\varepsilon_{it}^r. \quad (72)$$

Here, $\hat{q}_{it} = \ln q_{it}$ and $\hat{q}_t = \ln q_t$ because $\ln \bar{q}_i = \ln \bar{q} = 0$ from the symmetry between the two countries. In particular, the symmetry ensures that $\ln \bar{q} = \ln \bar{c} - \ln \bar{c}^* = 0$ and that $\ln \bar{q}_i = \ln \bar{q} + \bar{p}_i^* - \bar{p}_i = 0$. Therefore, (72) is equivalent to (29) in Proposition 1.

A.5 The model with CRRA preferences

So far, we have assumed that the preferences of households are given by $U(c, n) = \ln c - \chi n$. In this appendix, we assume more general CRRA preferences, $U(c, n) = c^{1-\sigma}/(1 - \sigma) - \chi n^{1+\varphi}/(1 + \varphi)$, where $\sigma \neq 1$ and $\varphi \neq 0$. We modify the first-order conditions for households to allow for the degree of relative risk aversion. Under $\sigma \neq 1$, the first-order conditions imply $S_t = (M_t/M_t^*)^\sigma (P_t/P_t^*)^{1-\sigma}$.

If we maintain the assumption that the money supply follows a random walk, the equation for S_t leads to nominal exchange rate growth that is predictable using the inflation of the two countries.³⁶ Because this is inconsistent with the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle, we replace this assumption with the new assumption on the money growth rate:

$$\Delta \ln M_t = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \pi_t + \frac{1}{\sigma} \varepsilon_t^M, \quad (73)$$

$$\Delta \ln M_t^* = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \pi_t^* + \frac{1}{\sigma} \varepsilon_t^{M*}. \quad (74)$$

Under (73) and (74), the nominal exchange rate continues to follow a random walk.³⁷

Using the CIA constraints, we can rewrite (73) and (74) as:

$$\sigma \Delta \hat{c}_{t+k} + \pi_{t+k} = \varepsilon_{t+k}^M, \quad (75)$$

$$\sigma \Delta \hat{c}_{t+k}^* + \pi_{t+k}^* = \varepsilon_{t+k}^{M*}, \quad (76)$$

for $k > 0$. Later, we utilize (75) and (76) for deriving the estimation equation.

A.5.1 The derivation of the estimation equation

To derive the estimation equation, we follow the same procedure as the derivation of (29). When $\sigma \neq 1$, the international risk-sharing condition (3) is replaced by $q_t = (c_t/c_t^*)^\sigma$. Combining its log-linearized expression with (28), \hat{q}_{it} can be written as

$$\hat{q}_{it} = (\hat{p}_{it}^* - \sigma \hat{c}_t^*) - (\hat{p}_{it} - \sigma \hat{c}_t). \quad (77)$$

We focus on $\hat{p}_{it} - \sigma \hat{c}_t$ and $\hat{p}_{it}^* - \sigma \hat{c}_t^*$ and obtain the expression for \hat{q}_{it} using (77). Note that (24) remains valid even under the CRRA preferences. Therefore, we subtract $\sigma \hat{c}_t$ from both sides of (24) and arrange terms to get

$$\hat{p}_{it} - \sigma \hat{c}_t = \lambda (\hat{p}_{it-1} - \sigma \hat{c}_{t-1}) - \lambda \varepsilon_t^M + (1 - \lambda) (\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \sigma \hat{c}_t), \quad (78)$$

where we replace $\sigma \Delta \hat{c}_t + \pi_t$ by ε_t^M using (75). Analogously, (26) remains valid under the

³⁶In particular, the nominal exchange rate growth is given by $\Delta s_t = \sigma \varepsilon_t^n + (1 - \sigma)(\pi_t - \pi_t^*)$, meaning that $\pi_t - \pi_t^*$ can help forecast Δs_t .

³⁷To see this, note that the nominal exchange rate growth is given by: $\Delta s_t = \sigma (\Delta \ln M_t - \Delta \ln M_t^*) + (1 - \sigma)(\pi_t - \pi_t^*)$. Substituting (73) and (74) into the above equation yields $\Delta s_t = (\sigma - 1)(\pi_t - \pi_t^*) + (1 - \sigma)(\pi_t - \pi_t^*) + \varepsilon_t^M - \varepsilon_t^{M*} = \varepsilon_t^n$.

CRRA preferences. Using (26), we have

$$\hat{p}_{it}^* - \sigma \hat{c}_t^* = \lambda(\hat{p}_{it-1}^* - \sigma \hat{c}_{t-1}^*) - \lambda \varepsilon_t^{M^*} + (1 - \lambda)(\hat{p}_{it}^{opt^*} - \hat{c}_t^*). \quad (79)$$

Therefore, the good-level real exchange rate is

$$\hat{q}_{it} = \lambda \hat{q}_{it-1} + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + (1 - \lambda)[(\hat{p}_{it}^{opt^*} - \sigma \hat{c}_t^*) - (\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \sigma \hat{c}_t)]. \quad (80)$$

Equations (78)–(80) generalize (66)–(68), respectively.

We next focus on the expression inside the brackets on the right-hand side of (80). For the case of $\sigma \neq 1$ and $\varphi \neq 0$, we recalculate the log optimal prices: $\hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H)$, $\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_H^*)$, $\hat{p}_{Fi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}^*, m_F^*)$, and $\hat{p}_{Fi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}, m_F)$. Even in the case of $\sigma \neq 1$ and $\varphi \neq 0$, (61) continues to hold. However, \hat{w}_t is no longer equal to \hat{c}_t and is now given by $\hat{w}_t = \sigma \hat{c}_t + \varphi \hat{n}_t$. Accordingly, we rewrite (61) as

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_{Hi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}, m_H) &= m_H(\sigma \hat{c}_t + \varphi \hat{n}_t) - \hat{a}_{it} \\ &\quad + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\lambda \delta)^k [m_H(\sigma \Delta \hat{c}_{t+k} + \pi_{t+k} + \varphi \Delta \hat{n}_{t+k}) - \Delta \hat{a}_{it+k}]. \\ &= m_H \sigma \hat{c}_t - (1 - \lambda \delta) \hat{a}_{it} + m_H \varphi \left(\frac{1 - \lambda \delta}{1 - \lambda \delta L^{-1}} \right) \hat{n}_t, \end{aligned} \quad (81)$$

where L is the lag operator. In the second equality, we used (75) and replaced $\sigma \Delta \hat{c}_{t+k} + \pi_{t+k}$ by ε_{t+k}^M , which greatly simplifies the equation.

Equation (81) differs from (20) in the presence of the forward-looking terms for the labor supply. Equations for $\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_H^*)$, $\hat{p}_{Fi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}^*, m_F^*)$, and $\hat{p}_{Fi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}, m_F)$ are

$$\hat{p}_{Hi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ht}^*, m_H^*) = m_H^* \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - (1 - \lambda \delta) \hat{a}_{it} + m_H^* \varphi \left(\frac{1 - \lambda \delta}{1 - \lambda \delta L^{-1}} \right) \hat{n}_t, \quad (82)$$

$$\hat{p}_{Fi}^*(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}^*, m_F^*) = m_F^* \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - (1 - \lambda \delta) \hat{a}_{it}^* + m_H^* \varphi \left(\frac{1 - \lambda \delta}{1 - \lambda \delta L^{-1}} \right) \hat{n}_t^*, \quad (83)$$

$$\hat{p}_{Fi}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{Ft}, m_F) = m_F \sigma \hat{c}_t - (1 - \lambda \delta) \hat{a}_{it}^* + m_F \varphi \left(\frac{1 - \lambda \delta}{1 - \lambda \delta L^{-1}} \right) \hat{n}_t^*, \quad (84)$$

respectively.

Using (25) and (27), $\hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \sigma \hat{c}_t$, and $\hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \sigma \hat{c}_t^*$ are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_{it}^{opt} - \sigma \hat{c}_t &= -(1-m)\sigma \hat{c}_t - (1-\lambda\delta)[\omega \hat{a}_{it} + (1-\omega)\hat{a}_{it}^*] \\ &\quad + \varphi \frac{1-\lambda\delta}{1-\lambda\delta L^{-1}} [\omega m_H \hat{n}_t + (1-\omega)m_F \hat{n}_t^*], \end{aligned} \quad (85)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_{it}^{opt*} - \sigma \hat{c}_t^* &= -(1-m)\sigma \hat{c}_t^* - (1-\lambda\delta)[\omega \hat{a}_{it}^* + (1-\omega)\hat{a}_{it}] \\ &\quad + \varphi \frac{1-\lambda\delta}{1-\lambda\delta L^{-1}} [\omega m_H \hat{n}_t^* + (1-\omega)m_F \hat{n}_t], \end{aligned} \quad (86)$$

respectively. In (86), we assumed that $m_F^* = m_H$ and $m_H^* = m_F$.

Plugging (85) and (86) into (80) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{q}_{it} &= \lambda \hat{q}_{it-1} + (1-\lambda)(1-m)\hat{q}_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + (1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\delta)\psi \varepsilon_{it}^r \\ &\quad - \varphi \psi_m \frac{(1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\delta)}{1-\lambda\delta L^{-1}} (\hat{n}_t - \hat{n}_t^*), \end{aligned} \quad (87)$$

where $\psi_m = \omega m_H - (1-\omega)m_F$. Equation (87) differs from (72) in that the former includes the forward-looking terms for labor supply. If $\varphi = 0$, these forward-looking terms disappear, and the equation coincides with (72). Under our assumptions, σ does not appear in (87). More importantly, σ does not affect the coefficient on the aggregate real exchange rate.

As in the proof of Proposition 2, the symmetry between the two countries implies that $\bar{q}_i = \bar{q} = 1$, and thus $\hat{q}_{it} = \ln q_{it}$ and $\hat{q}_t = \ln q_t$. Likewise, the symmetry implies the same steady-state labor supply between the two countries: $\bar{n} = \bar{n}^*$, leading to $\hat{n}_t - \hat{n}_t^* = \ln n_t - \ln n_t^*$. Substitution of these equations into the above equation leads to

$$\begin{aligned} \ln q_{it} &= \lambda \ln q_{it-1} + (1-\lambda)(1-m) \ln q_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + (1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\delta)\psi \varepsilon_{it}^r \\ &\quad - \varphi \psi_m \frac{(1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\delta)}{1-\lambda\delta L^{-1}} (\ln n_t - \ln n_t^*), \end{aligned} \quad (88)$$

which generalizes (29).

To derive the estimation equation for our empirical analysis, we use the definition of \tilde{q}_{it} and \tilde{q}_t and further rewrite (88) as

$$\ln \tilde{q}_{it} = (1-m) \ln \tilde{q}_t + (1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\delta)\psi \varepsilon_{it}^r - \varphi \psi_m \frac{(1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\delta)}{1-\lambda\delta L^{-1}} (\ln n_t - \ln n_t^*),$$

or equivalently,

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \tilde{q}_{it} - \lambda \delta \mathbb{E}_t \ln \tilde{q}_{it+1} &= (1 - m)(\ln \tilde{q}_t - \lambda \delta \mathbb{E}_t \ln \tilde{q}_{t+1}) \\ &\quad - (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda \delta) \varphi \psi_m (\ln n_t - \ln n_t^*) + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda \delta) \psi \varepsilon_{it}^r, \end{aligned} \quad (89)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_t \varepsilon_{it+1}^r = 0$.

Let $\ln \tilde{\tilde{q}}_{it} = \ln \tilde{q}_{it} - \lambda \delta \tilde{q}_{it+1}$ and $\ln \tilde{\tilde{q}}_t = \tilde{q}_t - \lambda \delta \tilde{q}_{t+1}$. Our estimation equation is

$$\ln \tilde{\tilde{q}}_{it} = \alpha + \beta \ln \tilde{\tilde{q}}_t + \gamma' X_{it} + u_{it}, \quad (90)$$

where X_{it} includes the log-difference in labor supply $\ln n_t - \ln n_t^*$ and γ includes $-(1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda \delta) \varphi \psi_m$ as an element. Note that OLS is no longer a valid estimation because u_{it} now includes forecast error $\ln \tilde{q}_{it+1} - \mathbb{E}_t \ln \tilde{q}_{it+1}$ and $\ln \tilde{q}_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t \ln \tilde{q}_{t+1}$. We thus use the instrument for estimation. For the data source of $\ln n_t - \ln n_t^*$, we take the indices of total hours worked from *OECD.Stat* with the base year as 2010.

Table A.1 reports the estimation results of (90). The left panel presents the results of the US–Canadian city pairs, while the right panel points to the results of the UK–Euro area city pairs. In both panels, we assume a common λ in specifications (1) and (2) and the good-specific λ in specifications (3) and (4). Specifications (2) and (4) include the city-pair-specific fixed effects as additional explanatory variables. We instrument $\ln \tilde{\tilde{q}}_t$ by $\ln \tilde{q}_{t-1}$ in all specifications. In all cases, the null hypothesis of full attention, namely $\beta = 0$, is significantly rejected. The estimated values of m are much smaller than one, suggesting robustness to changes in the assumption of preferences.

A.6 Estimation results for (40)

Table A.2 reports the estimation results for (40). Unlike the case of (36), the presence of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of (40) implies a dynamic panel structure. Therefore, dynamic panel regression estimators, such as the generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), need to be employed in place of OLS (see, e.g., Crucini and Shintani, 2008 and Crucini et al., 2010a). The left panel of the table presents the estimation results of the US–Canadian city pairs, whereas the right panel shows those of the UK–Euro area city pairs. In specifications (2) and (4), we impose the restriction that the coefficients on $\ln q_{it-1}$ and $\Delta \ln S_t$ as control variables are the same as each other. This is because (29) indicates that $\ln q_{it-1}$ and $\varepsilon_t^n = \Delta \ln S_t$ have the same coefficient. Specifications

(3) and (4) differ from specifications (1) and (2) in that the regressions include η_t^r as a control variable.

The table indicates that, in all regressions, the null hypothesis that $\beta = 0$ in (40) is statistically rejected. In addition, the estimates of β are all positive, consistent with the theory. Therefore, even if we directly regress $\ln q_{ijt}$ on $\ln q_t$, the estimation results are consistent with the behavioral inattention of $0 < m < 1$.

A.7 Persistence of the good-level real exchange rate

A.7.1 Proof of Proposition 3

As a preparation, we rewrite (41) in terms of the log deviation:

$$\hat{q}_t = \rho_q \hat{q}_{t-1} + \rho_q \varepsilon_t^n. \quad (91)$$

The variance of \hat{q}_t is given by $\sigma_q^2 = [\rho_q^2 / (1 - \rho_q^2)] \sigma_n^2$, so

$$\sigma_n^2 = \frac{1 - \rho_q^2}{\rho_q^2} \sigma_q^2. \quad (92)$$

In Appendix A.4, we have shown that the log deviation of the LOP deviations is

$$\hat{q}_{it} = \lambda \hat{q}_{it-1} + \theta \hat{q}_t + \lambda \varepsilon_t^n + \tilde{\psi} \varepsilon_{it}^r, \quad (93)$$

where $\theta = (1 - \lambda)(1 - m)$ and $\tilde{\psi} = (1 - \lambda)(1 - \lambda\delta)\psi$.

Let the covariances denote $R_0 = \mathbb{E} \hat{q}_t \hat{q}_{it}$ and $R_1 = \mathbb{E} \hat{q}_t \hat{q}_{it-1}$. They are written as

$$R_0 = \lambda R_1 + \theta \sigma_q^2 + \lambda \rho_q \sigma_n^2, \quad (94)$$

$$R_1 = \rho_q R_0, \quad (95)$$

which can be derived from (91) and (93).

We further simplify (94) and (95). Substitute (92) and (95) into (94) to get

$$R_0 = \lambda \rho_q R_0 + \left[\theta + \frac{\lambda(1 - \rho_q^2)}{\rho_q} \right] \sigma_q^2. \quad (96)$$

Note that, using the definition of ρ_q , the expression inside the brackets can be simplified as³⁸

$$\theta + \frac{\lambda(1 - \rho_q^2)}{\rho_q} = 1 - \lambda\rho_q. \quad (97)$$

Using (97), (96) and (95) become

$$R_0 = \sigma_q^2, \quad (98)$$

$$R_1 = \rho_q\sigma_q^2, \quad (99)$$

respectively.

We next work on the variance and the autocovariance that are denoted as $\sigma_{qi}^2 = \mathbb{E}\hat{q}_{it}^2$ and $\gamma_1 = \mathbb{E}\hat{q}_{it}\hat{q}_{it-1}$, respectively. Using (93), (98), and (99), we have

$$\sigma_{qi}^2 = \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda\rho_q\sigma_n^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2, \quad (100)$$

$$\gamma_1 = \lambda\sigma_{qi}^2 + \theta\rho_q\sigma_q^2. \quad (101)$$

We obtain (100) and (101) from tedious algebra. Regarding (100), we use (93) and (98)

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{qi}^2 &= \mathbb{E}\hat{q}_{it}^2 = \lambda\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it}\hat{q}_{it-1}) + \theta\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it}\hat{q}_t) + \lambda\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it}\varepsilon_t^n) + \tilde{\psi}\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it}\varepsilon_{it}^r) \\ &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it}\varepsilon_t^n) + \tilde{\psi}\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it}\varepsilon_{it}^r). \end{aligned}$$

Simplifying the last two terms on the right-hand side of the above equation yields (100):

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{qi}^2 &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda\mathbb{E}[(\lambda\hat{q}_{it-1} + \theta\hat{q}_t + \lambda\varepsilon_t^n + \tilde{\psi}\varepsilon_{it}^r)\varepsilon_t^n] + \tilde{\psi}\mathbb{E}[(\lambda\hat{q}_{it-1} + \theta\hat{q}_t + \lambda\varepsilon_t^n + \tilde{\psi}\varepsilon_{it}^r)\varepsilon_{it}^r] \\ &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda\theta\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_t\varepsilon_t^n) + \lambda^2\sigma_n^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2 \\ &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda(\theta\rho_q + \lambda)\sigma_n^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2 \\ &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda\rho_q\sigma_n^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2. \end{aligned}$$

The third equality results from (91), and the fourth equality is from the definition of ρ_q . Regarding (101), use (93) and (99) to get

$$\gamma_1 = \mathbb{E}\hat{q}_{it}\hat{q}_{it-1} = \lambda\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_{it-1}\hat{q}_{it-1}) + \theta\mathbb{E}(\hat{q}_t\hat{q}_{it-1}) + \lambda\mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_t^n\hat{q}_{it-1}) + \tilde{\psi}\mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{it}^r\hat{q}_{it-1}) = \lambda\sigma_{qi}^2 + \theta\rho_q\sigma_q^2.$$

³⁸To see this, $\theta + \lambda(1 - \rho_q^2)/\rho_q = \theta + \lambda(1 - \rho_q^2)/(\lambda/(1 - \theta)) = \theta + (1 - \rho_q^2)(1 - \theta) = 1 - \rho_q^2(1 - \theta)$. Applying the definition of ρ_q to this equation again, we obtain (97).

We further simplify σ_{qi}^2 and γ_1 . Using (92) and (101), (100) becomes

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_{qi}^2 &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \theta\sigma_q^2 + \lambda\rho_q\sigma_n^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2 \\ &= \lambda\gamma_1 + \left[\theta + \frac{\lambda(1-\rho_q^2)}{\rho_q}\right]\sigma_q^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2 \\ &= \lambda^2\sigma_{qi}^2 + \lambda\theta\rho_q\sigma_q^2 + \left[\theta + \frac{\lambda(1-\rho_q^2)}{\rho_q}\right]\sigma_q^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2.\end{aligned}$$

Recall that, from (97), the expression inside the brackets is $1 - \lambda\rho_q$. This implies,

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_{qi}^2 &= \lambda^2\sigma_{qi}^2 + [1 - \lambda\rho_q(1 - \theta)]\sigma_q^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2 \\ (1 - \lambda^2)\sigma_{qi}^2 &= (1 - \lambda^2)\sigma_q^2 + \tilde{\psi}^2\sigma_r^2,\end{aligned}$$

where we use $1 - \lambda\rho_q(1 - \theta) = 1 - \lambda^2$ given $\rho_q = \lambda/(1 - \theta)$. Therefore, σ_{qi}^2 and γ_1 are

$$\sigma_{qi}^2 = \sigma_q^2 + \frac{\tilde{\psi}^2}{1 - \lambda^2}\sigma_r^2. \quad (102)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_1 &= \lambda \left[\sigma_q^2 + \frac{\tilde{\psi}^2}{1 - \lambda^2}\sigma_r^2 \right] + \theta\rho_q\sigma_q^2 \\ &= (\lambda + \theta\rho_q)\sigma_q^2 + \frac{\lambda\tilde{\psi}^2}{1 - \lambda^2}\sigma_r^2 \\ &= \rho_q\sigma_q^2 + \frac{\lambda\tilde{\psi}^2}{1 - \lambda^2}\sigma_r^2.\end{aligned} \quad (103)$$

Now, because the first-order autocorrelation of the good-level real exchange rate is given by $\rho_{qi} = \gamma_1/\sigma_{qi}^2$,

$$\rho_{qi} = \gamma_1/\sigma_{qi}^2 = \omega_\rho\rho_q + (1 - \omega_\rho)\lambda, \quad (104)$$

where ω_ρ is defined as

$$\omega_\rho = \frac{\sigma_q^2}{\sigma_q^2 + \frac{\tilde{\psi}^2}{1-\lambda^2}\sigma_r^2} = \frac{1}{1+A} \in [0, 1]$$

because

$$A = \frac{\tilde{\psi}^2}{1 - \lambda^2} \frac{\sigma_r^2}{\sigma_q^2} \geq 0. \quad (105)$$

Equation (104) means that ρ_{qi} is the weighted average of ρ_q and λ . When we combine Proposition 2, namely $\rho_q \geq \lambda$, with (104), it immediately follows that $\rho_q \geq \rho_{qi} \geq \lambda$.

A.7.2 Derivation of (45) and (46)

Using $\rho_q = \lambda/(1 - \theta)$, eliminate λ from (104):

$$\rho_{qi} = \omega_\rho \rho_q + (1 - \omega_\rho)(1 - \theta) \rho_q = \rho_q [1 - \theta(1 - \omega_\rho)]. \quad (106)$$

Recall (92) and the definition of $\tilde{\psi}$. Then, (105) becomes (46):

$$A = (1 - \lambda)^2 (1 - \lambda\delta)^2 \tilde{\psi}^2 \frac{1 - \rho_q^2}{\rho_q^2 (1 - \lambda^2)} \left(\frac{\sigma_r}{\sigma_n} \right)^2. \quad (107)$$

From $\omega_\rho = 1/(1 + A)$, $1 - \omega_\rho = A/(1 + A)$. In addition, recall that $\theta = (1 - \lambda)(1 - m)$. Therefore, (106) implies

$$\frac{\rho_q}{\rho_{qi}} = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - \lambda)(1 - m) \frac{A}{1 + A}}. \quad (108)$$

Figure 1: Empirical distributions of the good-level real exchange rates





Figure 2: Persistence of the aggregate real exchange rate and the ρ_q to λ ratio




Figure 3: Persistence of the aggregate and the good-level real exchange rates and the ρ_q to ρ_{qi} ratio




Table 1: Estimation results of (36) under common λ

	Dependent variable: $\ln \hat{q}_{i,t}$ with $\lambda = 0.34$							
	US-Canadian city pairs				UK-Euro area city pairs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\ln \hat{q}_t$	0.844 (0.030)	0.802 (0.028)	0.812 (0.029)	0.806 (0.029)	0.856 (0.042)	0.851 (0.043)	0.853 (0.042)	0.868 (0.042)
Observations	389,500	389,500	389,500	389,500	214,115	214,115	213,064	213,064
Adj. R^2	0.225	0.262	0.225	0.262	0.265	0.323	0.265	0.324
city-pair FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Control for η_t^f	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
The implied degree of attention from the regression								
\hat{m}	0.156	0.198	0.188	0.194	0.144	0.149	0.147	0.132

NOTES: The left panel reports the estimation results based on 274 items and 64 US-Canadian city pairs. The right panel presents the estimation results based on 301 items and 36 UK-Euro area city pairs. The data used for the regressions cover the period from 1990 to 2015. The table reports the regression coefficients on $(1 - \lambda) \ln q_t$. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are the standard errors clustered by goods. Each specification includes good-specific fixed effects. Specifications (2) and (4) include city-pair fixed effects. In specifications (3) and (4), we control for the difference in the log of real GDP per hour worked. Regressions for the US-Canadian city pairs in the left panel also include dummy variables that control for the difference in timing of the price survey in Calgary from 2003 to 2014. Each column reports the estimate of m in the bottom row. The “Adj. R^2 ” denotes the adjusted R -squared.

Table 2: Estimation results of (36) under good-specific λ

	Dependent variable: $\ln \tilde{q}_{ijt}$ with good-specific λ							
	US-Canadian city pairs				UK-Euro area city pairs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\ln \tilde{q}_t^f$	0.894 (0.029)	0.862 (0.028)	0.883 (0.032)	0.880 (0.033)	0.866 (0.047)	0.834 (0.049)	0.864 (0.048)	0.840 (0.049)
Observations	389,500	389,500	389,500	389,500	171,606	171,606	170,750	170,750
Adj. R^2	0.256	0.294	0.256	0.294	0.246	0.295	0.247	0.295
city-pair FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Control for η_t^f	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
The implied degree of attention from the regression								
\hat{r}_t	0.106	0.138	0.117	0.120	0.134	0.166	0.136	0.160

NOTES: The dependent variable is $\ln \tilde{q}_{ijt} = \ln q_{ijt} - \lambda_i [\ln q_{ijt-1} - \ln(S_t/S_{t-1})]$, where λ_i is good specific and calibrated based on the previous studies. The calibrated λ_i in the US-Canadian city pairs is from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and that in the UK-Euro area city pairs is from Gautier et al. (2022). The table reports the regression coefficients on $\ln \tilde{q}_t^f = \ln(q_t/q_t^{\lambda_i})$. See the notes to Table 1 for the remaining details.

Table 3: Half-lives implied by the estimated degree of attention

		Half-lives of the aggregate real exchange rate		
		Predicted half-life	95% CI	Data
US–Canadian city pairs				
	$\hat{m} = 0.156$	2.620	[1.989, 4.010]	4.922
	$\hat{m} = 0.106$	3.704	[2.524, 7.605]	
UK–Euro area city pairs				
	$\hat{m} = 0.144$	2.812	[1.903, 6.129]	2.398
	$\hat{m} = 0.134$	2.998	[1.905, 8.868]	
		Half-lives of the good-level real exchange rate		
		Predicted half-life	95% CI	Data
US–Canadian city pairs				
	$\hat{m} = 0.156$	0.984	[0.851, 1.292]	1.606
	$\hat{m} = 0.106$	1.223	[0.963, 2.110]	
UK–Euro area city pairs				
	$\hat{m} = 0.144$	1.026	[0.834, 1.773]	1.182
	$\hat{m} = 0.134$	1.066	[0.834, 2.399]	

NOTES: The table reports the predicted half-lives of the aggregate and good-level real exchange rates. The unit of half-lives is a year, and the half-life under full attention is 0.64 years. The upper panel presents the half-lives of the aggregate real exchange rate, and the lower panel shows those of the good-level real exchange rate. To calculate the predicted half-lives in the table, we use the calibrated values of $\tau = 0.74$, $\varepsilon = 4$, $\sigma_r/\sigma_{\Delta s} = 5$, and $\delta = 0.98$. In all calculations, λ is kept constant at $\lambda = 0.34$.

In each panel, we report the half-lives for US–Canadian city pairs and UK–Euro area city pairs. The first column of the table reports the half-lives predicted by the model with partial attention, and the second column is their 95% confidence intervals denoted by “95% CI”. We compute the half-lives from \hat{m} and the 95% confidence intervals of \hat{m} based on specification (1) of Tables 1 and 2. For comparisons, the rightmost column presents the half-lives estimated from the EIU data. See the main text for the estimation of the half-lives from the EIU data.

Table A.1: Estimation results of (90)

	Dependent variable: $\ln \tilde{q}_{ijt}$							
	US-Canadian city pairs				UK-Euro area city pairs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
λ	0.34	0.34	good-specific	good-specific	0.34	0.34	good-specific	good-specific
$\ln \tilde{q}_t$	0.782 (0.034)	0.804 (0.034)	0.853 (0.041)	0.870 (0.041)	0.784 (0.050)	0.768 (0.052)	0.791 (0.063)	0.735 (0.065)
Observations	371,347	371,347	371,347	371,347	201,578	201,578	161,931	161,931
Adj. R^2	0.179	0.206	0.242	0.269	0.217	0.261	0.201	0.237
city-pair FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
The implied degree of attention from the regression								
m	0.218	0.200	0.147	0.130	0.216	0.232	0.209	0.265

NOTES: The dependent variable is $\ln \tilde{q}_{ijt} = \ln \tilde{q}_{ijt} - \lambda \delta \ln \tilde{q}_{ijt+1}$, where λ is calibrated at either common or good-specific λ . In each panel, specifications (1) and (2) report the results using common λ whereas specifications (3) and (4) report those using good-specific λ . The table reports the regression coefficients on $\ln \tilde{q}_t = \ln \tilde{q}_t - \lambda \delta \tilde{q}_{t+1}$. We use the instrument $\ln \tilde{q}_{t-1}$ to estimate parameters. See the notes in Table 1 for the remaining details.

Table A.2: Estimation results of (40)

	Dependent variable: $\ln q_{ijt}$							
	US-Canadian city pairs				UK-Euro area city pairs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\ln q_t$	0.302 (0.021)	0.300 (0.020)	0.264 (0.025)	0.261 (0.022)	0.077 (0.029)	0.107 (0.026)	0.074 (0.029)	0.103 (0.027)
Observations	371,347	371,347	371,347	371,347	202,621	202,621	201,578	201,578
P-value for Hansen's J-test	0.932	0.925	0.922	0.926	0.489	0.485	0.488	0.496
Control for η_t^f	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y

NOTES: The estimation equation is (40). Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we regress $\Delta \ln q_{ijt}$ on the lagged dependent variable $\Delta \ln q_{ijt-1}$, $\Delta \ln q_t$, $\Delta^2 \ln S_t$ along with the other control variables used in the benchmark regressions. In specifications (2) and (4), we impose the parameter restrictions that the coefficients on $\ln q_{ijt-1}$ and $\Delta \ln S_t$ are the same. In specifications (3) and (4), we control for the difference in the log of real GDP per hour worked. As suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), the levels of the lagged dependent variables are used as instruments, depending on the period of observation. "P-value for Hansen's J-test" denotes the p-value for the test of the over-identifying restrictions. The degrees of freedom for the chi-squared distribution under the null are 299 in specifications (1) and (3) and 300 in specifications (2) and (4). See the notes to Table 1 for the remaining details.