

Osaka-Rochester Workshop on Alternatives-to-markets Design

Friday, March 27, 2020

- 13:00 - 14:15 **Matías Núñez** (Ecole Polytechnique)
[*A Solution to The Two-person Implementation Problem*](#)
(with Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver)
- Hiroki Shinozaki** (Osaka University)
[*Efficient and Strategy-proof Multi-unit Object Allocation with Money: \(Non\)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Quasi-linearity*](#)
(with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa)
- Sean Horan** (Université de Montréal)
Game Forms for Strategy-proof Divorce
(with Yves Sprumont)
- 14:15 - 14:45 Break
- 14:45 - 16:00 **Ryosuke Sakai** (Osaka University)
Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Priority-augmented Object Allocation Problem with Discrete Payments
(with Shigehiro Serizawa)
- Andrew McKenzie** (Maastricht University)
[*Menu Mechanisms*](#)
(with Yu Zhou)
- Roberto Serrano** (Brown University)
[*Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies*](#)
(with Takashi Kunimoto)
- 16:00 - 16:30 Break
- 16:30 - 17:20 **Hervé Moulin** (University of Glasgow)
[*Guarantees in Fair Division*](#)

Saturday, March 28, 2020

9:00 - 10:15 **Madhav Raghavan** (University of Lausanne)
Transparency in Centralised Allocation
(with Rustamdjan Hakimov)

William Phan (North Carolina State University)
Partitionable Choice Functions
(with Umut Dur and Thayer Morrill)

Thayer Morrill (North Carolina State University)
Ranking Objects That Rank Back

10:15 - 10:45 Break

10:45 - 12:00 **Umut Dur** (North Carolina State University)
A Market Design Solution to Unfair Distribution of Teachers in Schools

Peter Troyan (University of Virginia)
[*School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and The Curse of Acceptance*](#)
(with Andrew Kloosterman)

M. Bumin Yenmez (Boston College)
Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves
(with Tayfun Sönmez)

12:00 - 13:10 Lunch

Saturday, March 28, 2020

- 13:10 - 14:00 **Eric Maskin** (Harvard University)
[*Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda*](#)
(with Partha Dasgupta)
- 14:00 - 14:15 Break
- 14:15 - 15:30 **Yoichi Kasajima** (Waseda University)
Improvement of Rural Hospitals and Its Welfare Consequences
(with Takashi Akahoshi and Manabu Toda)
- Maciej H. Kotowski** (Harvard University)
[*A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems*](#)
- Guillaume Haeringer** (Baruch College)
High Frequency Fairness
- 15:30 - 16:00 Break
- 16:00 - 17:15 **Patrick Harless** (University of Arizona)
[*Robust Revenue Sharing in Hierarchies*](#)
- Hiroo Sasaki** (Waseda University)
TBA
- William S. Zwicker** (Union College)
[*Envy Free Fair Division of Tangled Cakes and Envy Free Division of Graphs up to \$k\$ Items*](#)
(with Ayumi Igarashi)
- 17:15 - 17:45 Break
- 17:45 - 19:00 **Samson Alva** (University of Texas at San Antonio)
Combinatorial Choice with Graded Criteria
- Jingyi Xue** (Singapore Management University)
Resource Allocation with Ambiguous Needs
- Karol Flores-Szwagrzak** (Copenhagen Business School)
Samples and Choices

Sunday, March 29, 2020

- 9:00 - 10:15 **Vasilis Gkatzelis** (Drexel University)
[*A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching*](#)
(with Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, and Jason D. Hartline)
- Sylvia Pápai** (Concordia University)
[*Fairness Comparisons of Strategyproof and Efficient Matching Rules*](#)
(with Pooya Ghasvareh)
- Vikram Manjunath** (University of Ottawa)
Strategy-proof and Balanced Exchange of Indivisible Goods under Coarse Preferences
(with Alexander Westkamp)
- 10:15 - 10:45 Break
- 10:45 - 12:00 **Rodrigo A. Velez** (Texas A&M University)
[*Empirical Strategy-proofness*](#)
(with Alexander L. Brown)
- Yu Zhou** (Kyoto University)
Serial Vickrey Mechanisms
(with Shigehiro Serizawa)
- Shigehiro Serizawa** (Osaka University)
[*Strategy-proof Multi-object Mechanism Design: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with Non-quasilinear Preferences*](#)
(with Tomoya Kazumura and Debasis Mishra)